Chandler Construction v. Bellsouth Telecommunications

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Chandler Construction Services, Inc., Appellant,

v.

Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC d/b/a AT&T South
Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001170

Appeal From Charleston County
Jennifer B. McCoy, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-214
Submitted May 1, 2025 – Filed July 2, 2025

DISMISSED

James Atkinson Bruorton, IV, and Elizabeth Foy
Nicholson, both of Rosen Hagood, LLC, of Charleston,
for Appellant.

Jeffrey Miles Butler, of Woodard & Butler, of
Walterboro; Allen Mattison Bogan and Mary Scott-
Chancey Williams, both of Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, LLP, of Columbia; all for Respondent.
Bryan P. Kelley, of Elmore Goldsmith Kelly and deHoll,
P.A., of Greenville, for Amicus Curiae Carolinas AGC,
Inc.

PER CURIAM: This appeal arises from the circuit court's denial of Chandler
Construction's (Chandler) request for declaratory relief. The action was brought
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. 1 Specifically, Chandler argues the
circuit court erred in finding there is no affirmative obligation for an operator to
disclose duct-bank encasement materials to an excavator under the South Carolina
Underground Facility Damage Prevention Act (the Act).2 Accordingly, Chandler
further argues the circuit court erred in finding Bellsouth Telecommunications,
LLC, d/b/a AT&T South Carolina (AT&T) fulfilled its duties under the Act. We
decline to issue an advisory opinion and dismiss for lack of judiciable controversy.

Chandler asks this court to reverse the circuit court's order denying its declaratory
judgment action and find that the statutory language of the Act required AT&T
disclose the material of the duct-bank encasement. AT&T does not appeal the
circuit court's denial of its counterclaim for negligence against Chandler. Because
there is no controversy in which this court may provide relief to the parties, we
find an opinion would be purely advisory. "It is elementary that the courts of this
State have no jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions." Booth v. Grissom, 265 S.C.
190, 192, 217 S.E.2d 223, 224 (1975). The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
provides that "[c]ourts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have
power to declare rights, status[,] and other legal relations whether or not further
relief is or could be claimed." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-20 (2005). "Any
person . . . whose rights, status[,] or other legal relations are affected by a statute
[or] municipal ordinance . . . may have determined any question of construction or
validity arising under the . . . statute [or] ordinance . . . and obtain a declaration of
rights, status[,] or other legal relations thereunder." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-30
(2005). Despite the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act's broad language, it has its
limits. An adjudication that would not settle the legal rights of the parties would
only be advisory in nature and, therefore, would be "beyond the intended purpose
and scope of declaratory judgment." Power v. McNair, 255 S.C. 150, 154-55, 177
S.E.2d 551, 553 (1970). A declaratory judgment should not address moot or
abstract matters. Waller v. Waller, 220 S.C. 212, 223, 66 S.E.2d 876, 882 (1951).

1
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-10 et seq. (2005).
2
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-36-10 et seq. (2015).
Our supreme court has affirmed "an appellate court will not pass on moot and
academic questions or make an adjudication where there remains no actual
controversy." Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 567, 549 S.E.2d 591, 596 (2001).

Chandler asks this court to interpret the Act as requiring additional disclosures.
Adding this requirement to the language of the statute to bind future actions of
operators and excavators would be advisory here. Further, while the circuit court
denied declaratory relief to Chandler, it also denied AT&T's counterclaim for
negligence against Chandler. Accordingly, there is no outstanding controversy for
which this court can provide relief. See Pond Place Partners, Inc. v. Poole, 351
S.C. 1, 16, 567 S.E.2d 881, 889 (Ct. App. 2002) ("To state a cause of action under
the Declaratory Judgment Act, a party must demonstrate a justiciable controversy.
A justiciable controversy exists when a concrete issue is present, there is a definite
assertion of legal rights and a positive legal duty which is denied by the adverse
party.") (citation modified)). Chandler's proposed hypotheticals for the safety of
workers and the public are purely conjectural. An adjudication of the language of
the statute would not settle the legal disputes between Chandler and AT&T. The
circuit court held AT&T did not have an affirmative obligation under the Act to
disclose the duct-bank encasement material. Further, the court held Chandler was
not negligent under the Act in its excavation. We fail to see a controversy for
which Chandler may be afforded relief in any manner other than an advisory
opinion. See Orr v. Clyburn, 277 S.C. 536, 542, 290 S.E.2d 804, 807 (1982)
(holding "[t]he Declaratory Judgment Act is not properly invoked for an advisory
opinion to be put on ice by the plaintiff for use if the defendants or the applicant
reach the occasion which might demand it, nor is the Act a license to fish in this
judicial pond for legal advice about [an] investigation.").

Based on the foregoing, this appeal is

DISMISSED.3

THOMAS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.