State v. Breante D. Stevens

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Breante Deon Stevens, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000019

Appeal From Lancaster County
Brian M. Gibbons, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-179
Submitted May 14, 2025 – Filed June 4, 2025

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Attorney for Capital Appeals David
Alexander, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Randy E. Newman, Jr., of
Lancaster, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Breante Deon Stevens appeals his convictions for one count of
voluntary manslaughter, one count of assault and battery of a high and aggravated
nature (ABHAN), two counts of possession of a weapon during the commission of
a violent crime (weapons offenses), and one count of possession of a firearm by a
person convicted of a crime of violence (firearms offense). Stevens also appeals
his consecutive sentences of thirty years' imprisonment for voluntary manslaughter
and twenty years' imprisonment for ABHAN, and concurrent sentences of five
years' imprisonment for each of the two weapons offenses and the firearms offense.
On appeal, Stevens argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to bifurcate
the firearms offense because evidence of his prior conviction of a crime of violence
was probative only of the firearms offense and improperly suggested to the jury
that he had a propensity for violence, creating unfair prejudice against his
self-defense argument. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the trial court did not err in denying Stevens's motion to bifurcate the
firearms offense. See State v. Robinson, 426 S.C. 579, 591, 828 S.E.2d 203, 209
(2019) ("In criminal cases, appellate courts sit to review errors of law only."); see
also State v. Torres, 390 S.C. 618, 625, 703 S.E.2d 226, 230 (2010) ("The
appellate court reviews a trial [court]'s ruling on admissibility of evidence pursuant
to an abuse of discretion standard and gives great deference to the trial court.");
State v. Bryant, 372 S.C. 305, 312, 642 S.E.2d 582, 586 (2007) ("The conduct of a
criminal trial is left largely to the sound discretion of the trial [court], [which] will
not be reversed in the absence of a prejudicial abuse of discretion."); id. ("An abuse
of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision is unsupported by the evidence or
controlled by an error of law.").

In pretrial proceedings, Stevens moved to bifurcate the firearms offense in order to
exclude evidence of his prior conviction of a crime of violence during the first
phase of the trial, arguing it was necessary to prevent evidence of his prior
conviction from causing a prejudicial effect on the jury's consideration of the other
charges and his credibility. However, evidence before the jury regarding the prior
conviction was limited to (1) the State's stipulation that "Stevens has been
convicted of a crime of violence," and (2) Stevens's testimony that he was aware he
"illegal[ly]" possessed a firearm. Therefore, we hold the danger of unfair prejudice
from Stevens's prior conviction of a crime of violence did not substantially
outweigh its probative value. See Rule 403, SCRE (stating relevant evidence "may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice"); Rule 611(a), SCRE ("The court shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence
so as to . . . make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment
of the truth . . . ."); State v. Gleaton, 444 S.C. 394, 409, 906 S.E.2d 630, 637 (Ct.
App. 2024) ("Generally, 'a bifurcated proceeding is not required in a non-capital
case.'" (quoting Chubb v. State, 303 S.C. 395, 397, 401 S.E.2d 159, 161 (1991)));
id. at 409-11, 906 S.E.2d at 637-39 (holding the trial court did not err in denying
the defendant's motion to bifurcate the charge of possession of a firearm by a
person convicted of a crime of violence from additional charges, including murder
and arson, in part because the defendant's prior conviction of arson did not carry
"inherently prejudicial stigma"; thus, the danger of unfair prejudice did not
substantially outweigh the probative value of the defendant's prior conviction
(quoting State v. Cross, 427 S.C. 465, 478, 832 S.E.2d 281, 288 (2019))); see also
State v. Benton, 338 S.C. 151, 155-56, 526 S.E.2d 228, 230-31 (2000) (advising, in
a first-degree burglary case premised in part upon the defendant's two prior
burglary convictions, that a trial court should avoid potential prejudicial effects by
limiting the evidence to the fact of the two prior convictions and, upon request,
instructing the jury on the limited extent to which it can consider the prior
convictions).

AFFIRMED. 1

THOMAS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.