Jason Snow v. William Alexander

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Jason Snow, Appellant,

v.

William Alexander, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001761

Appeal From Greenville County
Perry H. Gravely, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-164
Submitted April 1, 2025 – Filed May 14, 2025

AFFIRMED

Ralph Gleaton, of Gleaton Law Firm, PC, of Greenville,
for Appellant.

David R. Harrison, of Pickens, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jason Snow appeals the circuit court's grant of a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) to William Alexander. On appeal, Snow
argues the circuit court erred in finding there was insufficient evidence to support
the jury's award of lost profits when evidence supported the amount with
"reasonable certainty or inference" such that expert testimony was not required to
prove lost profits. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Snow, we hold the circuit court
did not err in granting JNOV to Alexander because there was evidence to support
that Snow failed to establish a reasonably certain calculation of lost profits. See
Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 27-28, 602 S.E.2d 772, 782 (2004)
("When reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict or JNOV, an
appellate court must . . . view[] the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The appellate court will reverse the
[circuit] court only where there is no evidence to support the [circuit court's
ruling]." (citation omitted)); Jamison v. Hilton, 413 S.C. 133, 139, 775 S.E.2d 58,
61 (Ct. App. 2015) (stating a grant of JNOV is unwarranted when "the evidence
yields more than one reasonable inference or its inference is in doubt"); Gastineau
v. Murphy, 331 S.C. 565, 568, 503 S.E.2d 712, 713 (1998) ("A motion for JNOV
may be granted only if no reasonable jury could have reached the challenged
verdict.").

Snow sought past and future lost profits due to breach of an August 2019 contract
for the sale of a restaurant. At trial, he presented evidence of lost profits in the
form of a cash register receipt reflecting the restaurant's gross annual income in
2018, a 2018 tax return for the restaurant, and six cash register receipts reflecting
the restaurant's gross monthly income in January through July of 2019. Snow
asserted that the jury could calculate lost profits based on these documents by first
determining the restaurant's annual net profit, and then multiplying that figure by
either the seven years Snow had speculated he would lease the restaurant building,
or the three years that had passed since the breach of contract. In its written order
granting JNOV, the circuit court identified omissions in Snow's evidence of
damages that precluded a reasonably certain calculation of lost profits, including
that the jury heard no method for determining net profits; no evidence of what
income, expenses, or profit Snow could expect with reasonable certainty given
numerous potential COVID-19-related disruptions; no evidence to support that the
restaurant's year-to-year income or expenses would be similar; and only an
arbitrary duration of time over which to calculate lost profits. Because the
evidence presented in support of lost profits was limited in scope, we hold the
evidence was insufficient to support a reasonably certain calculation of lost profits.
See Drews Co. v. Ledwith-Wolfe Assocs., 296 S.C. 207, 213, 371 S.E.2d 532,
535-36 (1988) (stating in order to recover lost profits from a breach of contract, a
party must establish (1) the lost profits naturally resulted from the breach; (2) at the
time of contract formation, the parties reasonably contemplated the lost profits as a
probable consequence of the breach; and (3) "crucial[ly]. . . 'reasonable certainty'"
in calculations of lost profits (quoting S.C. Fin. Corp. v. W. Side Fin. Co., 236 S.C.
109, 122, 113 S.E.2d 329, 336 (1960))); Moore v. Moore, 360 S.C. 241, 255-56,
599 S.E.2d 467, 474-75 (Ct. App. 2004) (stating the amount of an award for lost
profits must be determined with "reasonable certainty"; in turn, reasonable
certainty "is sufficient if there is a certain standard or fixed method by which [lost]
profits . . . may be estimated and determined with a fair degree of accuracy."
(quoting Beck v. Clarkson, 300 S.C. 293, 298-99, 387 S.E.2d 681, 684 (Ct. App.
1989))); S.C. Fin. Corp., 236 S.C. at 122, 113 S.E.2d at 336 ("[R]ecovery cannot
be had for profits that are conjectural or speculative."); see also Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 352 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (stating lost profits may be proven
with reasonable certainty via "expert testimony, economic and financial data,
market surveys and analyses, business records of similar enterprises, and the like");
Drews Co., 296 S.C. at 214, 371 S.E.2d at 536 (finding a party's "expectations"
that "at least a third" of eleven months' gross profit would constitute net profit were
"wholly insufficient to provide the jury with a basis for calculating profits lost with
reasonable certainty" absent "any particular standard or fixed method for
establishing net profits"); cf. S.C. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Thornton-Crosby Dev. Co.,
310 S.C. 232, 233-33, 235-36, 423 S.E.2d 114, 115-16 (1992) (finding a
condominium developer established lost profits with reasonable certainty when (1)
within four months of contract formation, one-half of the units in the development
were pre-sold; (2) evidence included testimony that all units in the development
would have been sold within fourteen months of contract formation if not for the
builder's breach; and (3) the master-in-equity had reviewed the "expenses, pre-sold
sales, and anticipated sales").

AFFIRMED. 1

THOMAS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.