In the Interest of Khalid J., a Juvenile Under the Age of Seventeen

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

In the Interest of Khalid J., a Juvenile Under the Age of
Seventeen.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000413

Appeal From York County
David G. Guyton, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-155
Heard February 11, 2025 – Filed May 7, 2025

APPEAL DISMISSED

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Mark Reynolds
Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Kevin Scott
Brackett, of York, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Khalid J. appeals the family court's order requiring him to
register as a sex offender. Khalid argues the family court erred because he was not
statutorily required to register and the State failed to establish good cause to
support imposing registry. We dismiss this appeal as moot.
We hold the issues before the court are moot because South Carolina's
newly-amended Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA) does not require Khalid, a
juvenile, to register as a sex offender. See Sloan v. Friends of Hunley, Inc., 369
S.C. 20, 26, 630 S.E.2d 474, 477 (2006) ("A moot case exists where a judgment
rendered by the court will have no practical legal effect upon an existing
controversy because an intervening event renders any grant of effectual relief
impossible for the reviewing court."); 2022 S.C. Acts 221, § 8 (providing the new
act "is retroactive and [applies] to any resident of this State who currently is
required to register as a sex offender pursuant to the provisions of Article 7,
Chapter 3, Title 23"). The amended SORA includes section 23-3-436, which
governs the placement of juvenile offenders on the registry. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 23-3-436(B) (2025) ("A child who is fourteen years of age or older and has been
adjudicated delinquent of any other offense listed in [s]ection 23-3-430(C) [of the
South Carolina Code (2025)] may be required, in the discretion of the family court,
to register in accordance with this article."). Khalid was adjudicated delinquent
after a guilty plea to one count of third-degree violation of the Computer Crimes
Act, seven counts of blackmail or extortion, and one count of breach of peace of a
high and aggravated nature reduced from second-degree sexual exploitation of a
minor. None of these offenses are listed in section 23-3-430(C) of the South
Carolina Code. See S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-430(C) (enumerating specific offenses
that "must" and "may" require registry).

Section 23-3-430(C)(l) of the amended SORA provides that in addition to the
enumerated offenses of section 23-3-430(C), registry may be imposed for "any
other offense as described in [s]ection 23-3-430(D)" of the South Carolina Code
(2025). S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-430(C)(1)(i). Under the plain language of section
23-3-436(B), section 23-3-430(D) is distinct from "any other offense listed in
[s]ection 23-3-430(C)," and includes a separate test of "good cause" for
determining whether registry should be required as opposed to the new test
outlined in the juvenile offender statute, which sets forth its own guidelines for the
family court to utilize in its determination of whether a juvenile offender should be
required to register as a sex offender. See § 23-3-436(B) ("A child who is fourteen
years of age or older and has been adjudicated delinquent of any other offense
listed in [s]ection 23-3-430(C) [of the South Carolina Code (2025)] may be
required, in the discretion of the family court, to register in accordance with this
article."); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-430(D) ("Upon conviction, guilty plea, or plea of
nolo contendere of a person of an offense not listed in this article, the presiding
judge may order as a condition of sentencing that the person be included in the sex
offender registry if good cause is shown by the prosecution."); Hodges v. Rainey,
341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("Where the statute's language is plain
and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory
interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another
meaning."); Creswick v. Univ. of S.C., 434 S.C. 77, 81-82, 862 S.E.2d 706, 708
(2021) ("Under the plain meaning rule, this [c]ourt has no right to search for or
impose another meaning or resort to subtle or forced construction to change the
scope of a clear and unambiguous statute."). We find the argument that section
23-3-436(B) intended to include section 23-3-430(D) due to its reference in section
23-3-430(C)(1)(i) to be unconvincing; beyond contradicting the plain language of
the statute, to construe section 23-3-436(B) in such a way to permit registry for any
possible offense at the family court's discretion would render the limiting language,
"any other offense listed in [s]ection 23-3-430(C)," superfluous. See CFRE, LLC
v. Greenville Cnty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881 (2011)
(explaining a statute should be read "as a whole and in a manner consonant and in
harmony with its purpose" and such "that no word, clause, sentence, provision[,] or
part shall be rendered surplusage, or superfluous" (quoting State v. Sweat, 379 S.C.
367, 377, 665 S.E.2d, 645, 651 (Ct. App. 2008))). Further, under section
23-3-430(D), "the presiding judge may order registry if good cause is shown by the
solicitor." (emphases added). Here, the solicitor did not attempt to show good
cause, noted the attending physician's recommendation that sex offender
registration not be required, and left registering "in [the court's] discretion." Our
finding as to the applicability of section 23-3-430 of the South Carolina Code
(2025) is purely one of statutory interpretation and does not comment on the nature
of Khalid's offenses, which were reprehensible.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and VINSON, JJ., concur.