Claudine Garver v. McLeod Loris Seacoast Hospital

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Claudine Garver, Both Individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Jeremy Garver, Appellant,

v.

McLeod Loris Seacoast Hospital; McLeod Physician
Associates, II; and Michael McCaffrey, M.D.,
Defendants,

Of which McLeod Loris Seacoast Hospital is the
Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000577

Appeal From Horry County
William H. Seals, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-150
Submitted April 1, 2025 – Filed April 30, 2025

AFFIRMED

Stefan Bjorn Feidler, of Feidler Law Firm, LLC, of
Charleston, for Appellant.

J. David Banner, of Aiken Bridges Elliott Tyler &
Saleeby, P.A., of Florence; Gordon Wade Cooper, of
Buyck & Sanders, LLC, of Mount Pleasant; and Hugh
W. Buyck and Jeffrey Herman Lappin, both of Buyck
Law Firm, LLC, of Mount Pleasant, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Claudine Garver, both individually and as personal
representative of the estate of Jeremy Garver, appeals the circuit court's order
granting summary judgment in favor of McLeod Loris Seacoast Hospital
(Hospital). Garver argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment
because (1) her negligence claim against Hospital sounded in ordinary negligence
and (2) she presented evidence supporting her ordinary negligence claim and
establishing Hospital's negligence proximately caused Jeremy Garver's (Jeremy's)
death. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Garver, we hold the circuit
court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Hospital because
Garver's negligence claim did not sound in ordinary negligence, and she failed to
present expert testimony establishing the applicable professional standard of care
and evidence supporting a finding Hospital's alleged negligence proximately
caused Jeremy's death. Further, we find Garver's proximate cause argument
amounted to a claim of loss of chance, which is not recognized by South Carolina
courts. See Kitchen Planners, LLC v. Friedman, 440 S.C. 456, 463, 892 S.E.2d
297, 301 (2023) (holding summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law); Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 477, 744 S.E.2d 161, 166 (2013)
("[I]t is not sufficient for a party to create an inference that is not reasonable or an
issue of fact that is not genuine."); USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg, 377 S.C.
643, 653, 661 S.E.2d 791, 796 (2008) ("When reviewing the grant of a summary
judgment motion, appellate courts apply the same standard that governs the trial
court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP, which provides that summary judgment is proper
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); Singleton v. Sherer, 377 S.C. 185, 197,
659 S.E.2d 196, 202 (Ct. App. 2008) ("On appeal from an order granting summary
judgment, the appellate court will review all ambiguities, conclusions, and
inferences arising in and from the evidence in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party."); Pederson v. Gould, 288 S.C. 141, 143, 341 S.E.2d 633, 634
(1986) ("In medical malpractice actions, the plaintiff must use expert testimony to
establish both the required standard of care and the defendant's failure to conform
to that standard, unless the subject matter lies within the ambit of common
knowledge and experience, so that no special learning is needed to evaluate the
conduct of the defendant."); Dawkins v. Union Hosp. Dist., 408 S.C. 171, 177-78,
758 S.E.2d 501, 504 (2014) ("[I]f the patient . . . receives 'nonmedical,
administrative, ministerial, or routine care,' expert testimony establishing the
standard of care is not required, and the action instead sounds in ordinary
negligence."); Pederson, 288 S.C. at 142, 341 S.E.2d at 634 ("Expert testimony is
not required . . . in situations where the common knowledge or experience of
laymen is extensive enough for them to be able to recognize or infer negligence on
the part of the doctor and also to determine the presence of the required causal link
between the doctor's actions and the patient's medical problems."); Hoard ex rel.
Hoard v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 387 S.C. 539, 546, 694 S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (2010) ("A
plaintiff alleging medical malpractice must provide evidence showing: (1) the
generally recognized and accepted practices and procedures that would be
followed by the average, competent physician in the defendant's field of medicine
under the same or similar circumstances, and (2) the defendant departed from the
recognized and generally accepted standards. . . . Additionally, the plaintiff must
demonstrate the defendant's departure from such generally recognized practices
and procedures proximately caused the plaintiff's alleged injuries and damages.");
Jones v. Owings, 318 S.C. 72, 75, 456 S.E.2d 371, 373 (1995) ("In the context of
medical malpractice, the 'loss of chance' doctrine permits a recovery when the
delay in proper diagnosis or treatment of a medical condition results in the patient
being deprived of a less than even chance of surviving or recovering."); id. at 77,
456 S.E.2d at 374 (declining to adopt the "loss of chance" doctrine in South
Carolina).

AFFIRMED. 1

THOMAS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.