State v. Michael J. Kennedy

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Michael Justin Kennedy, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001293

Appeal From Greenville County
G. D. Morgan, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-095
Submitted February 1, 2025 – Filed March 19, 2025

AFFIRMED

Senior Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Ambree Michele Muller, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of
Greenville, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Michael Justin Kennedy appeals his convictions for trafficking
methamphetamine, trafficking heroin, possession with intent to distribute a
controlled substance, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a
violent crime; and his sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment. On appeal,
Kennedy argues the trial court erred when it refused to suppress evidence
discovered at his apartment during the execution of a search warrant because the
warrant lacked probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the trial court did not err by refusing to suppress the evidence discovered
at Kennedy's apartment. Under the totality of the circumstances, there was
sufficient information in the affidavit to support a finding of probable cause to
search Kennedy's apartment for drugs because (1) a nexus existed between the
initial tip from the confidential informant (CI) and Kennedy's apartment and (2) the
controlled buy corroborated the CI's tip and credibility. See State v. Frasier, 437
S.C. 625, 633-34, 879 S.E.2d 762, 766 (2022) (explaining an appellate court
reviews the trial court's factual findings regarding a motion to suppress based on
the Fourth Amendment "for any evidentiary support, but the ultimate legal
conclusion . . . is a question of law subject to de novo review"); State v. Davis, 354
S.C. 348, 355, 580 S.E.2d 778, 782 (Ct. App. 2003) (stating "a reviewing court
should give great deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause");
State v. Kinloch, 410 S.C. 612, 616, 767 S.E.2d 153, 155 (2014) ("A search or
seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment if it is authorized by a warrant that
is supported by probable cause."); State v. Corns, 310 S.C. 546, 550, 426 S.E.2d
324, 326 (Ct. App. 1992) ("[A] probable cause affidavit must state facts so closely
related to the time of the issuance of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable
cause at that time."); State v. Dupree, 354 S.C. 676, 690, 583 S.E.2d 437, 444 (Ct.
App. 2003) (stating that "[w]here the affidavit is based in part on information
provided by an informant of unknown reliability, police corroboration of details
provided in the tip may establish probable cause"); id. at 685, 583 S.E.2d at 442
("The magistrate's task in determining whether to issue a search warrant is to make
a practical, common sense decision concerning whether, under the totality of the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit, . . . there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the particular place to be
searched."); State v. Thompson, 419 S.C. 250, 257, 797 S.E.2d 716, 719 (2017)
("In determining whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause, the
crucial element is not whether the target of the search is suspected of a crime, but
whether it is reasonable to believe that the items to be seized will be found in the
place to be searched."); State v. Scott, 303 S.C. 360, 362, 400 S.E.2d 784, 786 (Ct.
App. 1991) ("Based on the totality of the circumstances outlined in the affidavit
and considering the nature of the evidence sought and the type of offense involved,
the magistrate . . . made a practical, common sense decision that a fair probability
existed that additional evidence regarding [the defendant's] drug activities could be
found in [the defendant's] home.").

AFFIRMED. 1

KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.