Willie M. Williams v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Willie Marvin Williams, Respondent-Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Petitioner-Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000796

Appeal From Greenville County
Robin B. Stilwell, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-077
Heard December 5, 2024 – Filed March 5, 2025

REVERSED

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown,
all of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Senior Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this appeal from the grant of Willie Marvin Williams's
application for post-conviction relief (PCR), this court granted certiorari to review
whether the PCR court erred in (1) finding that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the trial court's jury charge on mutual combat and (2) denying
the State's motion to alter or amend the order granting PCR without specifying
whether it granted relief on all or some of Williams's convictions. The State argues
that if the PCR court's grant of PCR is allowed to stand, it should be limited to
Williams's murder conviction. We reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April 2013, a Greenville County grand jury indicted Williams for murder,
attempted murder, unlawful conduct towards a child, and possession of a weapon
during the commission of a violent crime. Williams was accused of murdering his
wife, Natasha Kerns, attempting to murder Kerns's boyfriend, Anthony Wilson,
and unlawful conduct towards Kerns's son (Son).
Kerns called 911 from her cell phone on July 10, 2010, at about 4:50 a.m. On the
recording of the 911 call, Kerns told the operator that she believed someone was
outside her home because she heard noises and her dogs barking. She stated she
and Williams were divorcing and that an order of protection was in progress. She
stated she had a pistol for her own protection. She then told the 911 operator that
the person outside was Williams and that he was on her front porch. After a loud
noise could be heard on the recording, Kerns stopped responding to the 911
operator.
During the trial, Son1 testified that on the night of Kerns's death he knew
something was wrong when he "heard the first fire." He testified that Wilson was
in his room when this occurred. Son recalled that he saw Williams's Chrysler
outside his window. Son testified he crawled into the hallway because he heard
gunfire and saw Williams standing over Kerns's body shooting her. Son stated he
saw Williams leave in his car.
Wilson testified he met Kerns at a night club in Charlotte. He recalled that on July
9, 2010, he visited Kerns in Greenville and spent time with her, Son, and her
daughter (Daughter). Wilson stated he woke up after going to sleep in Kerns's
house because he heard the dog barking and "some ruckus going on around outside
the house." He testified that Kerns got out of bed, grabbed a gun from the floor
under her bed, and ran towards the front of the house. Wilson stated he took
Daughter to Son's room. He remembered hearing Kerns saying "something about

1
Son was nine years old at the time of the incident and twelve when he testified at
trial.
get away from my property, get away from my house, and stuff like that." Wilson
stated he heard banging outside and Kerns talking before it went "straight silent."
He testified he put Daughter on the bed with Son and then saw "a silhouette of a
human being coming down the hallway." He stated the person he saw was a man
he had never seen before. Wilson testified the man looked in Kerns's room, then
walked down the hallway and shot into Son's room three times, hitting Wilson with
the first shot. Wilson testified he was unconscious for an unknown amount of time
and woke up to Son shaking him. He stated that when he left Son's room, he found
Kerns dead by the window in the front room of the house and that before he could
leave the house the police arrived.

Cynthia Booker, who was Williams's girlfriend in July 2010, testified that she, her
aunt, and Williams went to a club on the night of July 9, 2010. Booker stated that
Williams left her and her aunt at the club around 3:45 a.m. on July 10, 2010. She
testified that Williams left in a hurry and she and her aunt had to find another ride
home.
Williams testified he called Kerns around 4:15 or 4:30 a.m. on July 10, 2010, but
she did not answer. He stated he then drove to Kerns's house, where he saw a
vehicle that he did not recognize. Williams testified he attempted to open the
storm door of the house but found it was locked. He testified he knocked on the
front door of the house for three to five minutes but received no answer. He
recalled that when he turned to walk away from the door he saw a curtain move, so
he tried to "peep in through the window." Williams testified he then heard a noise
behind him and turned to see a man, whom he identified as Wilson, approaching
him with a gun pointed at him. He demonstrated how he acted in self-defense to
the jury. He stated the gun went off while the men were struggling with each
other. Williams testified that they continued "wrestling" and fell through the
window into the home. He recalled the other man "got away from" him and may
have lost the gun temporarily before retrieving it. Williams stated he and the man
continued to fight as they moved through the house, during which the gun was
fired three times and the man fell to the ground. He testified he did not see
Daughter or Son in the bedrooms. He stated he then found Kerns in the front room
with no pulse and he began to have an "anxiety attack." Williams testified he saw
that Kerns had called 911, "flipped out," and left the home.
Williams testified he went home, paced around his yard, and then got back in the
Chrysler. He stated that when he saw the Chrysler's gas light was on, he decided to
drive his Chevrolet Tahoe instead. Williams recalled that he drove towards
Laurens, stopped at the church where his mother was buried, and went to find Son
and Daughter. Williams stated he stopped and spoke to a friend of his, Tracy Irby,
and told him he had "messed up" because if he had not gone to Kerns's house he
"wouldn't have got into the altercation and things." Williams testified he had
decided to return to his house when he passed a Laurens County Sheriff's officer's
car that began to follow him. He stated he continued to drive through Laurens with
the officer following him and that the police had blocked various roads to stop him.
Williams recalled that he had turned into a parking lot to avoid police when the
officer's car hit the back of the Tahoe. He testified that he took a knife out of the
Tahoe's glove compartment and stabbed himself in the chest because he was
suicidal.
The parties stipulated that a properly administered and stored gunshot residue test
was performed on Wilson and showed he had gunshot residue on his right palm,
the back of his right hand, his left palm, and the back of his left hand. The parties
further stipulated that a handprint found on a 1995 Lexus parked behind Kerns's
home was identified as Wilson's handprint.
James William Armstrong, who worked in the forensics division crime laboratory
for the Greenville County Department of Public Safety, testified that gunshot
reside could get on a person's hands "from actual contact with an area that may
have gunshot residue on it, being in close proximity of a firearm when it's being
fired, or even handling firearms." Armstrong also testified that the bullet from
Kerns's autopsy, the bullet recovered from the wall of Son's room, and bullets
taken by police from Williams's home in Laurens pursuant to a search warrant
were all .38 caliber bullets.
The trial court charged the jury on self-defense and accident. The trial court also
charged the jury on mutual combat, stating:
If the Defendant voluntarily participated in mutual
combat for purposes other than protection, the killing of
the victim would not be self-defense. This is true if even
during the combat the Defendant feared death or serious
bodily injury. However, if before the killing is
committed, the Defendant withdraws and tried in good
faith to avoid further conflict and either by word or act
makes the fact known to the victim, he would be without
fault in bringing on the difficulty. For mutual combat,
there must be a mutual intent and willingness to fight.
This intent may be shown by the acts and conduct of the
parties and the circumstances surrounding the combat. In
addition, it must be shown that both parties were armed
with a deadly weapon.

Trial counsel did not object to the trial court's instruction.

The jury found Williams guilty as indicted, and the trial court sentenced him to life
imprisonment for murder, thirty years' imprisonment for attempted murder, and ten
years imprisonment for unlawful conduct towards a child. The trial court also
imposed a sentence of five years' imprisonment, suspended to time served, on the
charge of possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.
Williams appealed and this court affirmed his convictions. State v. Williams,
2016-UP-215 (S.C. Ct. App. filed May 18, 2016). Williams filed an application
for PCR on December 28, 2016. In his PCR application, Williams argued, among
other things, that "trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the jury
charge as to mutual combat when no evidence was presented in support of such a
charge."
During the PCR hearing, Williams testified that Wilson's "bloody handprint" on
the car behind Kerns's house was proof he went outside that night despite the fact
that Wilson did not admit to going outside Kerns's house after her death. Williams
stated that the inconsistencies in the trial transcript indicated that the State did not
have a solid case due to factual disputes and therefore an error of law could have
affected the outcome of the case. One of Williams's trial counsel testified he did
not recall whether the trial court instructed the jury that mutual combat negated
self-defense. Both trial counsel testified they were not familiar with State v.
Taylor, 2 in which our supreme court held that the trial court's mutual combat
charge acted as a limitation on a defendant's ability to claim self-defense.

The PCR court granted PCR, finding trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the jury charge on mutual combat. The PCR court found that the mutual
combat charge negated the self-defense charge and therefore prejudiced Williams.
The PCR court also found a reasonable criminal defense attorney should have been
aware of the Taylor case and that even if they were not aware of Taylor, trial
counsel should have objected to the mutual combat charge because the evidence
did not support mutual combat.

2
356 S.C. 227, 235, 589 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2003) (finding that "the court's mutual
combat charge acted as a limitation on the Petitioner's ability to claim self-defense,
and prejudiced him by transferring the State's burden to disprove self-defense onto
the Petitioner, forcing him to prove self-defense").
The PCR court's order stated "the conviction of Willie M. Williams is overturned
and a new trial is granted." The State filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion, arguing
the PCR court should clarify which of Williams's convictions were affected by the
grant of PCR and that the grant of a new trial should be limited to his murder
conviction. The State also argued the PCR court erred in granting PCR because
the mutual combat charge did not prejudice Williams when self-defense was not
his main argument and any burden shifting caused by the instruction did not
prevent him from asserting his main defense, that of accident. The PCR court
denied the State's motion.

ANAYSIS

"In post-conviction proceedings, the burden of proof is on the applicant to prove
the allegations in his application." Speaks v. State, 377 S.C. 396, 399, 660 S.E.2d
512, 514 (2008). An appellate court will "defer to a PCR court's findings of fact
and will uphold them if there is evidence in the record to support them." Smalls v.
State, 422 S.C. 174, 180, 810 S.E.2d 836, 839 (2018). However, an appellate court
"review[s] questions of law de novo, with no deference to trial courts." Id. at
180-81, 810 S.E.2d at 839.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The State argues the PCR court erred in finding trial counsel deficient for failing to
object to the trial court's jury charge on mutual combat. The State further argues
the PCR court erred in finding the mutual combat jury instruction prejudiced
Williams because his primary defense at trial was accident, not self-defense, and
there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome had the trial court not
given the mutual combat charge "when the overwhelming evidence fail[ed] to
show self-defense." We agree in part.
We hold the PCR court erred by finding that trial counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced Williams. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694-96
(1984) (holding that to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a
PCR applicant must show (1) counsel's performance was deficient because it fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different); id. at 700 ("Failure to make the required showing of either
deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim.").
We hold there is no reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been
different had trial counsel objected to the trial court's mutual combat charge given
the evidence presented. See Jackson v. State, 355 S.C. 568, 573, 586 S.E.2d 562,
565 (2003) (reversing the PCR court's grant of PCR, finding that although counsel
was deficient for failing to request a self-defense charge, the instruction would not
have affected the outcome of trial given the overwhelming evidence presented of
Jackson's guilt). Williams testified he was served notice of a July 13, 2010 court
hearing for an order of protection Kerns sought against him and for child support.
He stated Kerns had told him she was afraid of him and had called the police
because she said he was threatening her during an argument they had in May 2010.
Booker recalled Williams leaving her and her aunt abruptly at a club in the early
morning of July 10, 2010. On the recording of her 911 call, Kerns stated she
believed Williams was on her front porch. Seconds later, a loud noise was heard
and Kerns stopped responding to the 911 operator. Kerns was shot through the
front window of her home. Taken together with Williams's testimony, the 911 call
contradicted his version of events. Wilson and Son testified that Wilson was in
Son's room when Williams entered Kerns's house and began shooting,
contradicting Williams's testimony that Wilson approached him outside the house
with a gun and that the shooting occurred while they fought. Williams also
switched cars when he returned home, led police on a high-speed chase, and
stabbed himself with a knife after an officer hit his car with a patrol car to force
him to stop. Additionally, Officers found bullets of the same caliber as those used
in the shooting in Williams's house in Laurens. Given the evidence presented
during the trial, we hold there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the trial
would have been different had the trial court not given the mutual combat charge.
Accordingly, we reverse the PCR court's grant of PCR.

II. Convictions Affected by PCR
The State argues the PCR court erred by failing to specify whether it granted a new
trial only as to Williams's murder conviction or as to all of his convictions.
Because we reverse the PCR court's grant of PCR, this court need not reach this
issue. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518
S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing an appellate court need not address the
appellant's remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of
the appeal).
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the PCR court's order granting Williams's application for
PCR is
REVERSED.
THOMAS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.