SCDSS v. Logan Cunningham

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

Logan Cunningham and Tayon Young, Defendants,

Of whom Logan Cunningham is the Appellant.

In the interest of minors under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000882

Appeal From Lexington County
W. Greg Seigler, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-043
Submitted January 31, 2025 – Filed February 3, 2025

AFFIRMED

Kindle Kay Johnson, of K. Johnson Law Firm, LLC, of
Rock Hill, for Appellant.

Luke Taylor Moore, of South Carolina Department of
Social Services, of Lexington, for Respondent.
Machelle Yvonne Thompson, of Thompson & Sete'fano,
LLC, of Columbia, for the Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Logan Cunningham (Mother) appeals a family court order
terminating her parental rights to her minor children (Children). On appeal,
Mother argues the family court erred in finding termination of parental rights
(TPR) was in Children's best interests because (1) the family court's order did not
set forth specific facts to support such a finding and (2) the South Carolina
Department of Social Services (DSS) failed to assess available relative placement
opportunities. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

"On appeal from the family court, the appellate court reviews factual and legal
issues de novo." Klein v. Barrett, 427 S.C. 74, 79, 828 S.E.2d 773, 776 (Ct. App.
2019). Under the de novo standard of review, this court may make its own
findings of fact. Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 595, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018).
Moreover, de novo review does not relieve the appellant of the burden of showing
that the preponderance of the evidence is against the family court's findings. Id.

We hold the family court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights.1
Initially, we find the family court's final order set forth sufficient facts to support
its conclusion that TPR was in Children's best interests, including Mother's history
with DSS dating back to 2020, her failure to complete her court-ordered placement
plan, and her continued positive drug screens. Additionally, we find Mother's
argument that DSS failed to assess available relative placement opportunities is
without merit. The DSS case worker testified that DSS assessed Children's
paternal grandparents (Grandparents) twice for placement of Children; in the first
instance, Father was still living with them, and on the second occasion,
Grandparents were unwilling to submit to the required drug screens. Mother also
put forth her stepmother as a potential relative placement, but evidence showed
DSS received this information only one week before the TPR hearing.

Moreover, we find TPR is in Children's best interests. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2024) (stating the family court may order TPR upon finding a
statutory ground for TPR is met and TPR is in the child's best interest); S.C. Dep't
of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133, 538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000)
("In a [TPR] case, the best interests of the children are the paramount
consideration."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010) ("The interests of the child

1
Mother did not appeal the statutory grounds for TPR.
shall prevail if the child's interest and the parental rights conflict."); S.C. Dep't of
Soc. Servs. v. Sarah W., 402 S.C. 324, 343, 741 S.E.2d 739, 749-50 (2013)
("Appellate courts must consider the child's perspective, and not the parent's, as the
primary concern when determining whether TPR is appropriate."). Children were
removed from Mother's care in November 2022 due to Mother's drug use, and at
the time of the March 2024 TPR hearing, Mother had not completed her placement
plan or demonstrated her ability to remain drug-free. Although Children had been
in their foster home for only one month at the time of the TPR hearing,
uncontroverted evidence showed they were placed together in a pre-adoptive foster
home. The case worker and guardian ad litem (GAL) acknowledged Mother
consistently visited Children, who appeared bonded to her; however, neither
Mother nor Father, whose rights were also terminated at the hearing, was in a
position to care for Children in the foreseeable future. Further, the evidence
showed Children, who were two and three years old at the time of the hearing,
were doing well and beginning to bond with their foster parents, and the GAL
recommended TPR. Accordingly, we hold the family court properly found TPR
was in Children's best interests. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2510 (2010) ("The
purpose of [the TPR statute] is to establish procedures for the reasonable and
compassionate [TPR] where children are abused, neglected, or abandoned in order
to protect the health and welfare of these children and make them eligible for
adoption . . . .").

AFFIRMED. 2

WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.