BCE 2015, LLC v. Yvonne C. Knight

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

BCE 2015, LLC, Appellant,

v.

Yvonne C. Knight and Eleanor C. Brown, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000405

Appeal From Berkeley County
Dale Edward Van Slambrook, Master-In-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-420
Submitted December 5, 2024 – Filed December 18, 2024

REVERSED

Stephen Peterson Groves, Sr., of Butler Snow, LLP, of
Charleston; and John Joseph Dodds, III, of John J. Dodds
III LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, both for Appellant.

Henry Ronald Stanley, of Stanley Law Group, of
Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: BCE 2015, LLC (Appellant) appeals an order from the
master-in-equity dismissing Appellant's action in which it sought a declaratory
judgment confirming or establishing an easement to a dirt road across land owned
by Yvonne C. Knight and Eleanor C. Brown (Respondents). On appeal, Appellant
argues the master erred by (1) finding it did not demonstrate it was entitled to an
easement by necessity; (2) finding it did not demonstrate it was entitled to an
implied easement by prior use; (3) finding it did not demonstrate it was entitled to
a prescriptive easement; (4) denying the admission of after-discovered evidence;
and (5) denying its post-trial motions pursuant to Rules 52(b) and 59(e) of the
South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. We reverse pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

We hold the master erred in finding Appellant was not entitled to an easement by
necessity. See Williams v. Tamsberg, 425 S.C. 249, 258, 821 S.E.2d 494, 499 (Ct.
App. 2018) ("Determining whether an easement exists is a question of fact in a law
action, and when tried by a judge without a jury, is subject to an 'any evidence'
standard of review."); Paine Gayle Props., LLC v. CSX Transp., Inc., 400 S.C. 568,
589, 735 S.E.2d 528, 539 (Ct. App. 2012) ("The elements of a claim for easement
by necessity are: (1) unity of title, (2) severance of title, and (3) necessity."); Boyd
v. Bellsouth Tel. Tel. Co., 369 S.C. 410, 420, 633 S.E.2d 136, 141 (2006) ("The
necessity element of easement by necessity must exist at the time of the
severance[.]"). In 1882, the land was one parcel that was severed into separate
lots. In 2015, Appellant purchased two lots that have no direct access to a public
road and are bordered to the North, East, and South by Respondents' lots. There is,
however, a dirt road that runs from South to North through Respondents' property
that would provide Appellant with access to a public road. Although the master
found Appellant presented "no evidence" that this dirt road was in use at the time
of severance and that evidence of a plat of land to the west "by itself" was
insufficient to establish Appellant's land was without any other means of ingress
and egress, Appellant also presented records showing that in 1828 a road was in
use at the approximate location of the dirt road and there were no alternative means
to access the lots. Further, Appellant presented testimony demonstrating the dirt
road had been in use for decades, indicating its use was likely necessary to reach
the landlocked lots. Thus, Appellant has established that at the time the lots were
severed, the dirt road was the only means of access to the newly landlocked lots,
necessitating an easement. See id. ("The necessity required for easement by
necessity must be actual, real, and reasonable as distinguished from convenient,
but need not be absolute and irresistible."); see generally Morrow v. Dyches, 328
S.C. 522, 529, 492 S.E.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997) ("[T]he whole point of the
easement by necessity doctrine is to ensure that landlocked parcels have access to a
public road; thus, the doctrine presumes or implies that the grantor intended for the
grantee of a landlocked parcel to have access, which is one of the rights essential to
the enjoyment of land.").
Because we reverse as to the first issue, we need not address Appellant's remaining
issues on appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C.
598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court need not address
remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

REVERSED. 1

THOMAS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.