Rebecca Hagood v. Palmetto Faith Operating

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Rebecca C. Hagood as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Frank D. Chavis, Sr., Respondent,

v.

Palmetto Faith Operating, LLC d/b/a Faith Healthcare
Center and Brooks Arnette, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001712

Appeal From Marion County
H. Steven DeBerry, IV, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-401
Submitted November 21, 2024 – Filed November 27, 2024

AFFIRMED

Stephen Lynwood Brown, Russell Grainger Hines,
Donald Jay Davis, Jr., Matthew Oliver Riddle, and Kara
Shea Grevey, all of Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston,
for Appellants.

Allen Keith McAlister, Jr., of Hawk Law Group, of
Aiken, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Palmetto Faith Operating, LLC d/b/a Faith Healthcare Center
(the Facility) and Brooks Arnette appeal the circuit court's order denying their
motions to compel to arbitration the claims of Rebecca C. Hagood as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Frank D. Chavis, Sr. On appeal, Appellants argue
the circuit court erred by denying its motion to compel arbitration. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

First, we hold the circuit court did not err in denying Appellants' motions to
compel arbitration because the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration
Agreement did not merge. See Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580,
596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001) ("The question of the arbitrability of a claim is an
issue for judicial determination, unless the parties provide otherwise."); New Hope
Missionary Baptist Church v. Paragon Builders, 379 S.C. 620, 625, 667 S.E.2d 1,
3 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is
subject to de novo review."); Stokes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 351 S.C. 606, 609-10,
571 S.E.2d 711, 713 (Ct. App. 2002) ("However, the circuit court's factual findings
will not be overruled if there is any evidence reasonably supporting them.");
MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Christianson, 377 S.C. 210, 214, 659 S.E.2d 209, 211
(Ct. App. 2008) ("[W]e apply South Carolina law to the initial determination of
arbitrability but look to federal law for additional guidance."); Wilson v. Willis, 426
S.C. 326, 335, 827 S.E.2d 167, 172 (2019) ("Whether an arbitration agreement
may be enforced against a nonsignatory to the agreement is a matter subject to de
novo review by an appellate court."); Est. of Solesbee by Bayne v. Fundamental
Clinical & Operational Servs., LLC, 438 S.C. 638, 648-49, 885 S.E.2d 144, 149
(Ct. App. 2023), cert. denied (Apr. 16, 2024) (finding the admission agreement and
arbitration agreement did not merge after considering (1) the admission agreement
provided it was governed by South Carolina law and the arbitration agreement
provided it was governed by federal law, (2) the arbitration agreement recognized
the two documents were separate by stating the arbitration agreement "shall
survive any termination or breach of this Agreement or the Admission
Agreement," (3) the documents were separately paginated and had their own
signature pages, and (4) signing the arbitration agreement was not a precondition to
admission); Coleman v. Mariner Health Care, Inc., 407 S.C. 346, 355, 755 S.E.2d
450, 455 (2014) (concluding that by their own terms, language in the admission
agreement that "recognize[d] the 'separatedness' of [the arbitration agreement] and
the admission agreement" and a clause allowing the arbitration agreement to "be
disclaimed within thirty days of signing while the admission agreement could not"
indicated the parties' intention "that the common law doctrine of merger not
apply"); Hodge v. UniHealth Post-Acute Care of Bamberg, LLC, 422 S.C. 544,
562-63, 813 S.E.2d 292, 302 (Ct. App. 2018) (determining an admissions
agreement and arbitration agreement did not merge because the fact "the
[a]dmissions [a]greement indicated it was governed by South Carolina law,
whereas the [a]rbitration [a]greement stated it was governed by federal law[,]"
"each document was separately paginated and had its own signature page[,]" and
"the [a]rbitration [a]greement stated signing it was not a precondition to
admission" evidenced the parties' intention that the documents be construed as
separate instruments). Here, as in Solesbee and Hodge, (1) the two agreements
were governed by different bodies of law because the Admission Agreement was
governed by state law and the Arbitration Agreement was governed by federal law;
(2) each document was separately labeled, numbered, and contained its own
signature page; (3) the Arbitration Agreement recognized the two documents were
separate, stating the Arbitration Agreement "shall survive any termination or
breach of this Agreement or the Admission Agreement"; and (4) the Facility
acknowledged that signing the Arbitration Agreement was not a prerequisite to
admission to the Facility. Thus, the Admission Agreement and Arbitration
Agreement did not merge. Because we find the documents did not merge, a
controlling consideration of whether the Arbitration Agreement bound Frank D.
Chavis, Sr., we decline to reach Appellants' remaining arguments. See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598
(1999) (ruling an appellate court need not address remaining issues when its
resolution of a prior issue is dispositive); Est. of Solesbee, 438 S.C. at 649, 885
S.E.2d at 149 (determining that because the admission agreement and arbitration
agreement did not merge, the equitable estoppel argument was properly denied);
Coleman, 407 S.C. at 356, 755 S.E.2d at 455 ("Since there was no merger here,
appellants' equitable estoppel argument was properly denied by the circuit court.");
Hodge, 422 S.C. at 563, 813 S.E.2d at 302 (concluding "equitable estoppel would
only apply if documents were merged").

AFFIRMED. 1

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.