Paris Mountain Utilities, Inc. v. SC DHEC

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Paris Mountain
Utilities, Inc., Joe W. Hiller, and David N. Hiller, Appellants,

v.

South Carolina
Department of Health and Environmental Control, Respondent.

Appeal From Greenville County

Larry R. Patterson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-599

Heard November 4, 2009 – Filed December
16, 2009   

AFFIRMED

Randall Scott Hiller, of Greenville, for
Appellants.

Stephen P. Hightower, of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  In this administrative appeal, Paris
Mountain Utilities, Inc., Joe W. Hiller, and David N. Hiller assert the circuit
court erred in affirming the administrative law court's finding that subject
matter jurisdiction was appropriate.  Appellants further contest the
application of collateral estoppel to pierce the corporate veil and hold the Hillers
personally liable for the acts or omissions of Paris Mountain Utilities, Inc.  We
affirm the order of the circuit court pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and
the following authorities:

1.  As to subject
matter jurisdiction:  City of Rock Hill v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl.
Control, 302 S.C. 161, 165, 394 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1990) (finding the
Department has the power to administratively assess penalties and/or damages
which may occur from violations of the Pollution Control Act); S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-600(A) (Supp. 2008) (stating an administrative law judge shall preside
over all hearings of contested cases); Mr. T v. Ms. T, 378 S.C. 127,
133, 662 S.E.2d 413, 416 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[T]he application of . . .
collateral estoppel principles are not matters of subject matter
jurisdiction.").

2.  As to collateral
estoppel: Lee County Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. v. MLD Charter Sch. Acad.
Planning Comm., 371 S.C. 561, 565, 641 S.E.2d 24, 27 (2007) ("This
Court reviews the order of the circuit court to determine whether it properly
applied the APA standard of review.");  Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co.,
381 S.C. 326, 329, 673 S.E.2d 801, 802 (2009) (indicating summary judgment is
appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is clear
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law);  Zurcher v.
Bilton, 379 S.C. 132, 135, 666 S.E.2d 224, 226 (2008) (holding when an
issue has been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment,
that determination is conclusive in a subsequent action);  Osman v. S.C.
Dep't of Labor, Licensing, & Regulation, 382 S.C. 244, 249, 676 S.E.2d
672, 675 (2009) (stating under the APA, a reviewing court may not substitute
its judgment for that of the agency on questions of fact, but may reverse if
the decision is clearly erroneous in view of substantial evidence);  Drury
Dev. Corp. v. Found. Ins. Co., 380 S.C. 97, 101, 668 S.E.2d 798, 800 (2008)
(quoting Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453, 457, 313 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ct.
App. 1984)) ("[A] corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity until
sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but when the notion of legal entity
is used to protect fraud, justify wrong, or defeat public policy, the law will
regard the corporation as an association of persons."). 

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS,
PIEPER, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.