State v. Bradley

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Antonio D.
Bradley, Appellant.

Appeal From Greenville County

C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2009-UP-168

Submitted April 1, 2009 – Filed April 27,
2009

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Elizabeth A. Franklin, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior
Asst. Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
Robert Mills Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Antonio
Bradley appeals from his convictions for criminal
sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor in the second-degree and committing a lewd
act upon a child.  Bradley argues the trial court committed reversible error in
(1) prohibiting him from meaningfully cross-examining the State’s witnesses, (2)
admitting inappropriate collaborative testimony, and (3) allowing inadmissible
hearsay into evidence.  We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1. As to whether the trial court prohibited meaningful
cross-examination of the State’s witnesses: State v. Simmons, 360 S.C.
33, 46, 599 S.E.2d 448, 454 (2004) (stating the failure to make a proffer of
excluded evidence will preclude review on appeal); State v. Santiago,
370 S.C. 153, 634 S.E.2d 23 (Ct. App. 2006) (requiring a proffer of testimony
to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial
judge and stating an appellate court will not consider alleged error in the
exclusion of testimony unless the Record on Appeal shows fairly what the
excluded testimony would have been); State v. Hawkins, 310 S.C. 50, 54,
425 S.E.2d 50, 57 (Ct. App. 1992) (declining to rule on the court’s alleged
error of excluding evidence when no proffer was made, and the excluded evidence was not contained in the Record).

2.
As to whether the trial court admitted inappropriate collaborative testimony: State
v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) (“A party may
not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.”); State v.
Holliday, 333 S.C. 332, 509 S.E.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating to preserve an alleged error in
admitting evidence, the objection should be sufficiently specific to bring into
focus the precise nature of the alleged error so it can be reasonably
understood by the trial judge). 

3.
As to whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing inadmissible
hearsay into evidence: State v. Johnson, 363 S.C. 53, 58-59, 609 S.E.2d
520, 523 (2005) (internal citations omitted) (“To preserve an issue for review
there must be a contemporaneous objection that is ruled upon by the trial court.  The objection should be
addressed to the trial court in a sufficiently specific manner that brings
attention to the exact error.  If a party fails to properly object, the party
is procedurally barred from raising the issue on
appeal.”); State v. Vanderbilt, 287 S.C.
597, 598, 340 S.E.2d 543, 544 (1986) (stating an issue that is not properly
preserved cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); Rule 803(3), SCRE (explaining a "statement
of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical
condition” is not excluded by the hearsay rule).  

AFFIRMED.[1]

Huff,
Williams, and Konduros, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.