Poston v. Davis

CourtListener 10155567Scctapp30.03.2009

Gesamter Gesetzestext

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Nelson Poston, Appellant,

v.

Michael W.
Davis, Respondent.

Appeal From Beaufort County

Marvin H. Dukes, III, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No.  2009-UP-154

Submitted March 2, 2009 – Filed March 30,
2009

AFFIRMED

Stephen F. DeAntonio, of Charleston, for Appellant.

Davis H. Smith,
II, of Rincon, Georgia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Nelson Poston appeals the trial court’s
denial of his motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment. Poston argues he
was not required to respond to Michael Davis’s complaint because it was not
properly commenced within the three-year statute of limitations.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1),
SCACR, and the following authority:  Unisun
Ins. v. Hawkins, 342 S.C. 537, 541-43, 537 S.E.2d 559, 561-62 (Ct. App.
2000) (holding the defenses of insufficiency of service of process and statute
of limitations are affirmative defenses which are waived if not properly plead
in the responsive pleading).

AFFIRMED.[1]

HEARN, C.J., PIEPER and LOCKEMY, concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.

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