SCDMV v. Galloway

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina
Department of Motor Vehicles, Respondent,

v.

Linda R.
Galloway, Appellant.

Appeal from the Administrative Law Court

 Ralph K. Anderson, III, Administrative Law Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-063

Submitted February 2, 2009 – Filed
February 3, 2009    

AFFIRMED

Desa Ballard and P. Christopher Smith, Jr., both of West Columbia,
and Reese I. Joye, of North Charleston, for Appellant.

Frank L. Valenta, Jr., of Blythewood, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Linda R. Galloway appeals the Administrative Law Court's
(ALC) order reversing the South Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings'
(hearing officer) order rescinding the suspension of Galloway's driver's
license.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities.

1.       As
to whether the ALC erred by failing to set forth a specific ground for
overturning the hearing officer's decision: S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (5)(e)
(Supp. 2008) (providing an appellate court may reverse or modify the decision
of the agency if the substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are
clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record).

2.       As to
whether the ALC erred in reversing the
hearing officer's holding that the police officer's testimony was insufficient
to establish the officer provided Galloway the correct implied consent
advisement: S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950 (Supp. 2008) (providing the arresting
officer must provide the implied consent advisement in writing prior to
administering a breath test, and setting forth the implied consent advisement); Felder v. Johnston, 127 S.C. 215, 217, 121 S.E. 54, 54 (1924) ("In
the absence of evidence to the contrary, courts are bound to presume that
public officers have properly discharged their duties and that their acts are
in all respects regular.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF,
WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.