Locklear v. Modern Continental

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Bernard
Locklear, Appellant,

v.

Modern Continental
South, Inc., Respondent.

Appeal From Marlboro County

 J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2009-UP-067

Submitted February 2, 2009 – Filed
February 9, 2009

AFFIRMED

Christopher G. Isgett, of Columbia, for Appellant.

M. Stephen Stubley, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Bernard
Locklear appeals the circuit court's affirmance of an order by the Appellate
Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission granting credit to
Locklear's employer for temporary total disablity paid after he reached maximum
medical improvement.  Locklear argues the circuit court erred in affirming because
such credit is expressly prohibited by section 42-9-20 of the South Carolina
Code (1985).  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Hendricks v. Pickens County, 335 S.C. 405, 416, 517 S.E.2d 698, 704 (Ct.
App. 1999) (finding circuit court did not err in affirming the Appellate Panel's
grant of credit to employer for temporary total disability paid after maximum
medical improvement); S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-210 (1985) ("Any payments made by an employer to an injured employee
during the period of his disability . . . which by the terms of this Title were
not due and payable when made may . . . be deducted from the amount to be paid
as compensation. . . .").

AFFIRMED.

Huff, Williams,
and Konduros, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.