State v. Jones

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Johnny Jones, Appellant.

Appeal From Dillon County

 John L. Breeden, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-715

Submitted December 1, 2008 – Filed
December 18, 2008   

AFFRIMED

Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior
Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
Jay E. Hodge, Jr., of Cheraw, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Johnny Jones appeals his conviction and
sentence for trafficking cocaine, arguing the trial court erred by refusing to
direct a verdict of acquittal.  Jones claims he was merely present as a
passenger in the vehicle in which cocaine was found and did not constructively
possess the drugs.

Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as we must, we find the
State offered sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove Jones had the right
to exercise constructive possession over the cocaine in the trunk of the car.  See State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292-93, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006)
(holding if there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial
evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the appellate
court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury).  Specifically,
Jones’s conduct after the vehicle was pulled over by the policeman indicated he
was likely a knowledgeable participant in a joint criminal act:  (1)  Jones was
a passenger without any luggage in a rental car traveling from Florida to
Virginia; (2) when explaining the purpose for this trip, Jones gave the
policeman an explanation that was completely at odds with the driver’s account;
(3) Jones contradicted himself when the policeman inquired about the person who
rented the vehicle, first stating it was his uncle who rented the vehicle but
admitting he did not know his uncle’s name, and finally confessing that it was
not his uncle who rented the car.  See id;  State v. Attardo,
263 S.C. 546, 550, 211 S.E.2d 868, 869 (1975) (explaining knowledge of an
illegal substance may be proved by circumstantial evidence of acts,
declarations, or conduct of the accused from which the inference may be drawn
that the accused knew of the existence of the prohibited substances); State
v. Brown, 319 S.C. 400, 404, 461 S.E.2d 828, 830-31 (Ct. App. 1995)
(finding appellant’s presence in a car at the time a drug sale occurred was
evidence of actual knowledge evidencing appellant’s intent to control the
disposition of the drugs);  State v. Heath, 370 S.C. 326, 329, 635
S.E.2d 18, 19 (2006) (stating constructive possession of an illegal substance
can be established by circumstantial or direct evidence); State v. Williams,
346 S.C. 424, 430, 552 S.E.2d 54, 57 (Ct. App. 2001) (same).

AFFIRMED.[1]

WILLIAMS, PIEPER, and GEATHERS, JJ.,
concur. 

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.