Metts v. Charleston County Assessor

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Muriel V. Metts, Respondent,

v.

Charleston County Assessor, Appellant.

Appeal From the Administrative Law Court

 Paige J. Gossett, Administrative Law
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-640

Submitted November 3, 2008 - Filed
November 17, 2008   

AFFIRMED

County
Attorney Joseph Dawson, III, Deputy County Attorney Bernard E. Ferrara, Jr.,
and Assistant County Attorney Bernice M. Jenkins, all of North Charleston, for
Appellant.

Muriel
V. Metts, pro se, of Sullivans Island, for Respondent

PER CURIAM: The Charleston County Assessor (Assessor) appeals from
an order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) granting Muriel V. Metts a
four-percent special property tax assessment ratio.  Metts received the
four-percent assessment ratio until 2006.  In 2005, the Legislature amended the
tax assessment ratio statute to guarantee a four-percent assessment ratio for
properties that otherwise qualified but were rented out for less than fifteen
days during the tax year.  Because Metts rented her home out for 85 days in
2006, the Assessor prepared her tax bill for that year using the higher
six-percent assessment ratio. 

We
affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities.  As to the
question whether the ALC erred in its judgment:  S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610
(Supp. 2007) (“The review of the administrative law judge’s order must be
confined to the record”; appellate court may reverse the ALC if the ALC’s
decision is “affected by [an] error of law.”); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c)(1)
(Supp. 2007) (“The legal residence . . . [is] taxed on an assessment equal to
four percent of the fair market value of the property.”); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 12-43-220(c)(2)(i) (Supp. 2007) (finding four percent assessment ratio
applies when “the owner-occupant [has] owned and occupied the residence as his
legal residence and [has] been domiciled at that address for some period during
the applicable tax year”); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c)(7) (Supp. 2007)
(renting out a residential property for fewer than fifteen days during the tax
year does not preclude that property from receiving the four percent assessment
ratio); and Russo v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 334 S.C. 455, 458, 513
S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ct. App. 1999) (“In statutory construction, legislative intent
prevails where it can be reasonably ascertained from the plain meaning of the statutory language.”).  As to the question
whether the ALC properly applied rules of statutory construction:  Aiken v.
World Fin. Corp., 373 S.C. 144, 644 S.E.2d 705 (2007) (finding issues not
raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not be considered on appeal).

AFFIRMED.

ANDERSON, HUFF,
and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.