Bordeaux v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Antonio D.
Bordeaux, Respondent,

v.

State of South
Carolina, Petitioner.

Appeal From Beaufort County

Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-284

Heard March 29, 2012 - Filed May 9, 2012

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley
W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General Matthew J. Friedman, and Assistant Attorney
General J. Rutledge Johnson, all of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this post-conviction relief (PCR) action, the State
appeals the PCR court's granting of a new trial to Respondent Antonio Bordeaux
on two first-degree burglary charges. The State argues Bordeaux pled guilty to
these charges, and, therefore, it challenges the PCR court's conclusion that
Bordeaux's sentences were illegal because they exceeded the maximum penalty for
second-degree burglary. We reverse and remand.

"'[A]ny
evidence' of probative value is sufficient to
uphold the PCR judge's findings." Cherry
v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 119, 386 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1989) (citation omitted). However, reversal is appropriate when the
PCR court's decision is controlled by an error of law. Suber v. State,
371 S.C. 554, 558-59, 640 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2007).

In the present case, Bordeaux was indicted for two
counts of first-degree burglary. He was also indicted for two counts of armed
robbery and one count of murder. The plea transcript indicates that the State had agreed to a dismissal of the murder
charge and a cap of twenty-five years of imprisonment in exchange for Bordeaux's plea of guilty to two counts of first-degree
burglary and two counts of armed robbery. The sentencing sheets indicate that
the plea court sentenced Bordeaux to twenty-four years for each count of armed
robbery and twenty-five years for each count of first-degree burglary, with all
sentences to run concurrently.

However, each sentencing sheet for the respective burglary
offenses contained internally inconsistent information as to whether Bordeaux had
pled guilty to first-degree burglary or second-degree burglary. Bordeaux
alleged in his PCR application that his sentence for twenty-five years was
illegal because he pled guilty to second-degree burglary and the twenty-five-year
sentence exceeds the maximum sentence for second-degree burglary. Bordeaux
also claimed that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
sentence.

At the PCR hearing, plea counsel testified that he did
not object to the sentences imposed because they were "within the
negotiation." He explained: "We had negotiated for a cap of twenty-five
years . . . ." Further, the PCR court specifically found that plea counsel
was not ineffective for failing to object to Bordeaux's sentence because
Bordeaux pled guilty to first-degree burglary. However, the PCR court also concluded
that the twenty-five-year sentence was illegal because it exceeded the maximum
sentence for second-degree burglary. In reaching this conclusion, the PCR
court ruled that the sentencing sheets took precedence over the plea transcript because "a sentencing
sheet is essentially a contract between the applicant, the applicant's trial
counsel, and the court."

We are unable to reconcile the PCR court's
finding that Bordeaux pled guilty to first-degree
burglary with its subsequent
conclusion that the twenty-five-year sentence
was illegal because it exceeded the maximum sentence for second-degree
burglary. The PCR court based its conclusion that plea counsel was not
ineffective for failing to object to Bordeaux's sentence on the finding that
Bordeaux pled guilty to first-degree burglary. If Bordeaux pled guilty to first-degree
burglary, then his sentence was not illegal. On the other hand, if Bordeaux
pled guilty to second-degree burglary, as the PCR court implied when it
concluded the sentence was illegal, then plea counsel would have been
ineffective for failing to object to an illegal sentence. Therefore, it is
necessary to remand this case to the PCR court for clarification as to the
offenses to which Bordeaux pled guilty.

Further, in the absence of any challenge to the integrity of the plea
transcript, the PCR court committed an error of law in ruling that the
sentencing sheets took precedence over the plea transcript because "a
sentencing sheet is essentially a contract between the applicant, the
applicant's trial counsel, and the court." See Anderson v. State, 342 S.C. 54, 57, 535 S.E.2d 649, 650 (2000) ("When determining issues relating to guilty pleas, the Court
will consider the entire record, including the transcript of the guilty
plea, and the evidence presented at the PCR hearing." (emphasis added)). Given the sanctity
with which statements given under oath are regarded,[1] we decline to lend credence to any
position that would favor ambiguous sentencing sheets over an unambiguous plea
transcript whose integrity has not been called into question. Therefore, on
remand, the PCR court must give appropriate weight to the plea transcript in
determining the offenses to which Bordeaux pled guilty.

REVERSED
AND REMANDED.

PIEPER,
KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (holding that solemn declarations in open court "carry a strong
presumption of verity"); see also State v. Thrift, 312 S.C. 282, 295, 440 S.E.2d 341, 348 (1994) ("[A]ll plea
agreements must be on the record and must recite the scope, offenses, and
individuals involved in the agreement."); cf.Edmonds v. Lewis, 546 F.2d 566, 567-68 (4th Cir. 1976) ("[T]he accuracy and
truth of a prisoner's denial of any threats inducing his plea of guilty, given
during an examination on the record at his sentencing . . . will be considered conclusively
established by that proceeding . . . unless he offers (by the allegations of
his petition) a valid reason why he should be permitted to depart from the
apparent truth of his earlier statement." (citations and quotation
marks omitted)).