Daigle v. SCDPPP

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Leonard Daigle, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department
of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, Respondent.

Appeal from the Administrative Law Court

Deborah Brooks Durden, Administrative Law
Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2012-UP-333 

Submitted May 1, 2012 – Filed May 30, 2012

AFFIRMED

Leonard Daigle, pro se.

Tommy Evans, Jr., of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Leonard
Daigle appeals the Administrative Law Court's (ALC) order dismissing his appeal
of the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services's (the Department) decision
denying him parole.  He argues the ALC erred in (1) dismissing his appeal and
(2) denying his motion to compel additional evidence for the record.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.   As to whether the ALC
erred in dismissing Daigle's appeal:  S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2011) (providing that the ALC shall not hear an appeal involving the denial of
parole to a potentially eligible inmate by the Department); Compton v. S.C.
Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 385 S.C. 476, 479, 685 S.E.2d
175, 177 (2009) (holding that an order denying parole and stating consideration
of all statutory and Department criteria is sufficient to avoid deeming an
inmate effectively ineligible for parole).

2. As to whether the ALC
erred in denying Daigle's motion to compel additional evidence for the record: 
S.C. Code Ann § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2011) (explaining that an appellate court
may only reverse a decision of the ALC if the substantive rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced).

AFFIRMED.

PIEPER,
KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.