State v. Epting

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Kevin Shane Epting, Appellant.

Appeal From Laurens County

D. Garrison Hill, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-152  

Heard February 13, 2012 – Filed March 7,
2012

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle DuRant, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, all of Columbia, and
Solicitor Jerry W. Peace, of Greenwood, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Kevin
Shane Epting appeals from his convictions of first-degree burglary and assault
and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), arguing the trial court
erred in prohibiting him from: (1) introducing evidence of third-party guilt,
and (2) cross-examining the victim on a 911 call she made two months prior to
the incident.  We affirm pursuant
to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1. As to
third-party guilt:  Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 330-31 (2006) (overruling the
application of limits on third-party guilt evidence only to the extent that
limits should not rely on the strength of the prosecution's evidence against
the defendant, but rather on the strength of the evidence proffered by the
defendant to establish third-party guilt); State v. Gregory, 198 S.C.
98, 104, 16 S.E.2d 532, 534 (1941) ("'[E]vidence which can have (no) other
effect than to cast a bare suspicion upon another, or to raise a conjectural
inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not admissible.'"
(quoting 16 C.J. 560)); id. at 104, 16 S.E.2d at 535  ("'[B]efore
such testimony can be received, there must be such proof of connection with it,
such a train of facts or circumstances, as tends clearly to point out such
other person as the guilty party.'" (quoting 20 Am. Jur. Evidence §
265 (1939))); id. (holding "[r]emote acts, disconnected and
outside the crime itself, cannot be separately proved for such a purpose"
and a defendant is not "permitted, by way of defense, to indulge in
conjectural inferences that some other person might have committed the offense
for which he is on trial, or by fanciful analogy to say to the jury that
someone other than he is more probably guilty"); State v. Burgess,
391 S.C. 15, 23, 703 S.E.2d 512, 517 (Ct. App. 2010) (stating Holmes v. South
Carolina preserves Gregory as the appropriate standard for
evaluating the admissibility of evidence of third-party guilt); State v. Williams, 380 S.C. 336, 343, 669 S.E.2d 640, 644
(Ct. App. 2008) (holding a trial judge is
given broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and the admission of evidence will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion); State v.
Rice, 375 S.C. 302, 317, 652 S.E.2d
409, 416 (Ct. App. 2007), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 710 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (ruling evidence offered by a
defendant as to the commission of the crime by another person must be limited
to facts that are inconsistent with the defendant's guilt, and the evidence
must raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to the accused's innocence).
  

2. As to
cross-examination:  State v. Page, 378 S.C. 476, 483, 663 S.E.2d 357, 360 (Ct. App. 2008)
("Whether a person opens the door to the admission of otherwise
inadmissible evidence during the course of a trial is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge."); id. at 481, 663 S.E.2d at 359
("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court
either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."); id. at 483, 663 S.E.2d at 360 ("Error is harmless where it could not
reasonably have affected the trial's outcome."); State v. Whitner, 380
S.C. 513, 519, 670 S.E.2d 655, 659 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding a violation of a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness is not per se
reversible error, and this court must determine if the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt).

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and
HUFF and SHORT, JJ., concur.