SCDSS v. J.W.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department
of Social Services, Respondent,

v.

J.W., J.F.,
John Doe, Defendants,

Of whom J.W. is
the Appellant.

In the interest of a minor child under the age of 18.

Appeal From Oconee County

Timothy M. Cain, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-073

Submitted February 1, 2012 – Filed
February 8, 2012   

REVERSED AS MODIFIED

William Cory Hughes, of Greenville, for
Appellant.

Kimberly Renae Welchel, of Walhalla, for
Respondent.

John Frederic Prescott, Jr., of Walhalla,
for Guardians ad Litem.

PER CURIAM:  J.W.
appeals the family court's permanency planning order, arguing the family court
erred in refusing to return her twelve-year-old grandson (Child) to her custody
and in adopting a concurrent permanency plan of termination of parental rights. 
We agree and reverse.[1]

On appeal from the family
court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de novo.  Simmons v.
Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011); see also Lewis
v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 386, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011).  "In appeals
from the family court, the appellate court has the authority to find the facts
in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the evidence."  Ex
parte Morris, 367 S.C. 56, 61, 624 S.E.2d 649, 652 (2006).  "If the
court determines at the permanency planning hearing that the child may be
safely maintained in the home in that the parent has remedied the conditions
that caused the removal and the return of the child to the child's parent would
not cause an unreasonable risk of harm to the child's life, physical health,
safety, or mental well-being, the court shall order the child returned to the
child's parent."  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1700(D) (Supp. 2010). 

We find the preponderance of
the evidence supports returning Child to J.W.'s custody as there is no
unreasonable risk of harm.  The examining psychologist and the Guardians ad
Litem testified they believe it is unsafe for Child to return to J.W.'s custody
primarily because of the potential for an incident in which she becomes
disabled due to her health concerns and is unable to care for Child.  We find these
concerns to be speculative and based on J.W.'s general condition and one unique
incident involving an adverse medication reaction.  The potential for any such
incident is further reduced by the fact that several members of J.W.'s family live
nearby, J.W. has a home health aide who is at her home approximately
forty-eight hours a week, and J.W. has a lifeline alert device linking her to
the hospital.  The psychologist testified J.W. was able to care for Child's
daily needs and, furthermore, Child has regularly spent extended periods of
time at J.W.'s home without incident.  Moreover, no one involved has doubted
that J.W. provides a loving home for Child and any threat of harm to Child is
speculative and not unreasonable.  Furthermore, in our view, returning Child to
J.W.'s custody is in Child's best interest and would achieve permanence in
Child's life.  See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129,
133, 538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding the best interests of the
child are the paramount consideration).  In sum, we believe the preponderance
of the evidence supports returning Child to J.W.'s home and order the
Department of Social Services to continue providing supervision and services
for six months from the date of filing of this opinion.  In addition, the
Guardians ad Litem shall continue to monitor the situation for six months from
the date of filing of this opinion.

Our determination on the
initial issue is dispositive; thus, we decline to address any remaining
issues.  See Futch
v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d
591, 598 (1999) (holding this court need not review remaining issues on appeal
when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive).

REVERSED AS
MODIFIED.

SHORT,
WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.