State v. Ward

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Arnold Ward, Appellant.

Appeal From Horry County

Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-123  

Submitted February 1, 2012 – Filed
February 29, 2012

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H.
Carter, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, all of Columbia; and
Solicitor J. Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Arnold Ward appeals his conviction for
attempted first-degree burglary.  On appeal, Ward contends the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the State failed to
provide sufficient evidence to show Ward intended to commit first-degree
burglary.  We disagree. 

"When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial
court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its
weight."  State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648
(2006).  "A defendant is entitled to
a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense
charged."  Id.  "When reviewing a denial of a directed
verdict, [an appellate c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."  Id.  "If there
is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably
tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the [appellate c]ourt must find the
case was properly submitted to the jury."  Id. at 292-93, 625
S.E.2d at 648. 

"A person is guilty of
burglary in the first degree if the person enters a dwelling without consent
and with intent to commit a crime in the dwelling, and . . . the entering or
remaining occurs in the nighttime."  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-311(A)(3)
(2003).  "A person who commits the common law offense of attempt is
punishable as for the principal offense. . . . [T]he mens rea of an attempt
crime is one of specific intent such that the act constituting the attempt must
be done with the intent to commit that particular crime."  State v.
Reid, 383 S.C. 285, 292, 679 S.E.2d 194, 197-98 (Ct. App. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).  "The State must prove the defendant's specific
intent was accompanied by some overt act, beyond mere preparation, in
furtherance of the intent."  Id. at 293, 679 S.E.2d at 198. 

The State provided direct
evidence Ward attempted to commit first-degree burglary.  The owner of the home
testified he was awakened just after midnight and saw Ward, dressed in dark
clothing, "squeeze and compress" an exterior door.  When the homeowner
turned on the lights, Ward fled and was later apprehended.  The homeowner
positively identified Ward as the individual he saw attempting to break into
the home.  Ward provided an alternative explanation for his presence at the
home; however, this explanation went to the weight of the evidence, not its
existence.  The jury could have properly inferred Ward intended to enter the
home to commit a crime.  Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State, the evidence supported submitting the case to the jury.

AFFIRMED.[1]

PIEPER,
KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 214, SCACR.