Cramer v. SCDC

CourtListener 10154421Scctapp25.01.2012

Gesamter Gesetzestext

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Joshua Cramer, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department
of Corrections, Respondent.

Appeal from the Administrative Law Court

John D. McLeod, Administrative Law Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-031

Submitted November 1, 2011 – Filed January
25, 2012   

VACATED AND REMANDED

Joshua Cramer, pro se, for Appellant.

Lake E. Summers and Katherine A. Phillips,
both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In
this inmate grievance case, Joshua Cramer appeals an Administrative Law Court's
(ALC) affirmation of the South Carolina Department of Corrections's
(Department) denial of his grievance regarding wages he earned while employed
in a prison industries project operated by the Department at Broad River
Correctional Institution.  We vacate and remand.[1]

Cramer is an inmate sentenced
to life imprisonment without parole.  He is currently incarcerated at the Broad
River Correctional Institution and participates in a prison industries project
making hardwood flooring.  He began employment with the project on May 2,
2005.  On April 26, 2007, Cramer filed a grievance labeled BRCI-0594-07.  In
this grievance, Cramer asserted a claim for back pay based on the Department's
failure to pay him the prevailing wage in the private sector for his work
performed in the prison industries project and a claim for immediate access to
his wages held in escrow pursuant to section 24-3-40(B) of the South Carolina
Code (2007).[2] 
The Department failed to issue a decision on this grievance, so Cramer filed a
subsequent grievance labeled BRCI-0015-08 on December 24, 2007.  In this
grievance, Cramer claimed the Department's failure to issue a decision on his
initial grievance violated the Department's policy providing for the resolution
of grievances within 180 days and requested the Department address his claims
presented in his initial grievance.  On June 11, 2008, the Department issued a
final decision denying grievance BRCI-0015-08 and stating that his initial
grievance BRCI-0594-07 was being held in abeyance until the appropriate
personnel obtained all the necessary information for processing his
grievance.    

Cramer appealed the denial of
his grievance BRCI-0015-08 to the ALC.  Cramer asked the ALC "to take
jurisdiction of my original grievance BR-0594-07 and resolve all my issues set
forth in my original grievance."  In his brief to the ALC, Cramer asserted
the claims presented in his original grievance BRCI-0594-07, claiming he was
entitled to back pay because the Department erred by not paying him the
prevailing wage for his work and that the Department erred by denying him
immediate access to his escrowed wages in violation of section 24-3-40(B).  The
ALC found the Department had denied Cramer's grievance BRCI-0594-07 and affirmed
the Department's denial of the grievance, finding the wages paid to Cramer were
proper under South Carolina case and statutory law and that Cramer was not
entitled to immediate access to his escrowed wages pursuant to section
24-3-40(B).  In addition, the ALC found Cramer's claims were barred by the
doctrine of laches and Cramer's failure to file a timely grievance pursuant to
the Department's procedural requirements.  This appeal followed.

Although "confined to
the record," the court of appeals has the authority to review a decision
of the ALC in order to determine whether "the substantive rights of the
petitioner have been prejudiced because the finding, conclusion, or decision is
. . . in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; . . . affected by
other error of law; . . . [or] arbitrary or capricious or characterized by
abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."  S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2010).  The ALC's factual findings must stand
unless they are "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence on the whole record."  Id.; see also Al-Shabazz
v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 380, 527 S.E.2d 742, 756 (2000) ("It has long
been established that the court may not substitute its judgment for that of an
agency on questions of fact when those facts are supported by substantial
evidence."). 

The ALC "shall preside
over all appeals from final decisions of contested cases."  S.C. Code Ann.
§ 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2010).  A "contested case" is defined as a
proceeding "in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party
are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for
hearing."  S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(3) (2005); see also Al-Shabazz,
338 S.C. at 375, 527 S.E.2d at 753 ("An inmate brings a contested case for
purposes of judicial review when he challenges a disciplinary outcome,
calculation of sentence-related credits, custody status, or other condition of
imprisonment.").  Accordingly, "the AL[C] has subject matter
jurisdiction to hear appeals from the final decision of the [Department] in a
non-collateral or administrative matter." Slezak v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.,
361 S.C. 327, 331, 605 S.E.2d 506, 507 (2004). 

In its order, the ALC found
"[o]n June 11, 2008, the Department issued its final decision and denied
all claims raised by Cramer in both grievances."  This finding is
unsupported by the evidence.  The decision referenced by the ALC was issued in
response to Cramer's grievance BRCI-0015-08, in which he complained that the
Department had not responded to his initial grievance regarding the issues of
back pay and his access to his escrowed wages.  The Department did not issue a
final decision on Cramer's grievance BRCI-0594-07 and, in fact, explicitly
stated that grievance was held in abeyance until the inmate grievance
coordinator received all the necessary information for processing the
grievance.  The record contains no evidence the Department ever issued a decision
on Cramer's initial grievance, BRCI-0594-07, regarding his claims to back pay
and immediate access to his escrowed wages.  Because the Department never
issued a final decision on those issues, the ALC erred in asserting
jurisdiction over the claims presented in Cramer's initial grievance. 
Accordingly, the ALC's order is vacated, and this case is remanded with
instructions for the ALC to consider only the issue raised in Cramer's
grievance BRCI-0015-08, namely the Department's failure to timely respond to
Cramer's initial grievance.     

VACATED AND REMANDED.

FEW, C.J.,
THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.

[2] Section 24-3-40(B) provides in relevant part: "The
Department of Corrections shall return a prisoner's wages held in escrow
pursuant to subsection (A) as follows: . . . (2) A prisoner serving life in
prison or sentenced to death shall be given the option of having his escrowed
wages included in his estate or distributed to the persons or entities of his
choice."

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