State v. Johnson

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Terrance D. Johnson, Appellant.

Appeal From Charleston County

Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2011-UP-411 

Submitted August 15, 2011 – Filed August
29, 2011

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek,
of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Terrance D. Johnson appeals his conviction for
trafficking cocaine, arguing the trial court erroneously denied his motion to
suppress the evidence found in his car because the circumstances of stopping
his car and detaining him mandated suppression, and the "discovery of the
gun and drugs were part and parcel of the same stop and detention."  We affirm.[1]

"In criminal cases, the
appellate court sits to review errors of law only" and is "bound by
the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous."  State
v. Butler, 353 S.C. 383, 388, 577 S.E.2d 498, 500 (Ct. App. 2003) (citations
omitted).  The appellate court applies the same standard of review to
preliminary factual findings in determining the admissibility of evidence in
criminal cases.  Id.  "Our review in Fourth amendment search and
seizure cases is limited to determining whether any evidence supports the trial
court's finding."  Id. (citation omitted).

"Where probable cause
exists to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, the decision to stop
the automobile is reasonable per se."  State v. Williams, 351 S.C.
591, 598, 571 S.E.2d 703, 707 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)).  Police presence "does not, standing alone,
constitute a seizure" when a reasonable person would believe he is free to
"go about his business."  Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.
567, 575-76 (1988) (citations omitted).  "[A]ny
object falling within the plain view of a law enforcement officer who is
lawfully in a position to view the object is subject to lawful seizure."  State
v. Abdullah, 357 S.C. 344, 352, 592 S.E.2d 344, 349 (Ct. App. 2004).

The trial court properly denied Johnson's motion to suppress
the evidence found in his car.  Evidence in the record supports the trial court's
finding that the stop was lawful and it ended.  A police officer stopped
Johnson in the parking lot of a flower shop for a license plate violation.  After
a stop of at most fifteen minutes, the officer gave Johnson a verbal warning,
told him he was free to go, and Johnson exited his car and entered the flower
shop.  Johnson's departure from the police's presence and entrance into the
flower shop is evidence he felt free to leave.  Thus, the trial court committed
no clear error regarding the lawfulness of this stop.

Further, evidence in the
record supports the trial court's finding that the discovery of a firearm in
plain view was a separate incident which led to the finding of the drugs. 
After Johnson entered the flower shop, the first officer and a backup officer
were walking back to their cars.  At that time, the backup officer noticed a
firearm on the floorboard of the driver's side of Johnson's car, through the
passenger-side window.  The officers then arrested Johnson for a firearm
violationpursuant to section 16-23-20 of
the South Carolina Code (2003).  An inventory search of the car led to the discovery
of drugs in the armrest of the car.  Therefore, the trial court's denial of the
motion to suppress is supported by the evidence.

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, PIEPER,
and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.