Goodson v. GEICO Indemnity Company

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Donald Lee Goodson, Appellant,

v.

GEICO Indemnity Company, Respondent.

Appeal From Richland County

 J. Michelle Childs, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2011-UP-376

Submitted June 1, 2011 – Filed July 25,
2011

AFFIRMED

W. Ralph Garris, of Columbia, for Appellant.

William H. Bowman, III, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Donald
Lee Goodson appeals an order finding he was not entitled to uninsured motorist
(UIM) coverage.   We affirm.[1]

Goodson sustained serious injuries when an automobile
struck the motorcycle he was operating.  The limits of the at-fault driver's
liability insurance were insufficient to compensate Goodson for his injuries
and other damages arising from the accident.  

At the time of the accident, Goodson's motorcycle was
insured by GEICO Indemnity Company under an Indemnity Cycle-Gard Motorcycle
Policy.  The limits of Goodson's liability coverage were 15/30/10.  Since
the inception of the policy in March 2003, Goodson never had UIM coverage on
this policy.

Goodson sued GEICO for reformation of the policy to
include UIM coverage, alleging GEICO failed to offer this coverage to him as
required by section 38-77-160 of the South Carolina Code (2002).  After a
nonjury trial, the trial court issued an order finding that pursuant to section
38-77-350(A) of the South Carolina Code (2002 & Supp. 2010), GEICO was
entitled to a conclusive presumption that it made a meaningful offer of UIM
coverage to Goodson.  In addition, although the court stated that evidence of
an insured's knowledge or level of sophistication would not be relevant as a
determination of whether an offer of UIM coverage was sufficient under section
38-77-350, it further found that GEICO's offer of UIM coverage provided
sufficient information for Goodson, considering his level of education and work
experience, to make an intelligent decision regarding whether or not to
purchase UIM coverage.  Goodson appeals.

1. The failure to comply strictly with section
38-77-350(A) when offering UIM coverage does not automatically require judicial
reformation of the policy to include such coverage.  Grinnell Corp. v. Wood,
389 S.C. 350, 357, 698 S.E.2d 796, 799 (2010).  "Rather, even where an
[insurer] is not entitled to the presumption that it made a meaningful offer,
it may prove the sufficiency of its offer by showing that it complied with Wannamaker."[2]  Id. at 357, 698 S.E.2d
799-800.

2. We hold the
offer of UIM coverage at issue here satisfied the Wannamaker requirements,
namely that (1) the insurer's notification process be commercially reasonable,
(2) the insurer specify the limits of optional coverage and not merely offer
additional coverage in general terms, (3) the insurer intelligibly advise the
insured of the nature of the optional coverage, and (4) the insured be told
that optional coverages are available for an additional premium.  State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wannamaker, 291 S.C. 518, 521, 354 S.E.2d 555, 556
(1987)

Goodson
concedes GEICO satisfied the first two prongs of the Wannamaker test. 
As to whether GEICO "intelligibly advised" Goodson of the nature of
optional coverage, the offer form contains a brief summary of the nature of UIM
coverage, including who would be able to recover, the circumstances under which
coverage would be available, and the extent of coverage.  It further advises
that if the insured rejects any of the offered coverages, including UIM
coverage, the form may be used by GEICO against the insured in the event the
insured seeks this coverage at a later time.  The form also provides GEICO's
toll-free telephone number, informs insureds that they may also contact the
South Carolina Department of Insurance with questions, and gives contact
information for the Department, including both its mailing and e-mail addresses
and local and toll-free telephone numbers.   On the final page of the offer
form appears a printed acknowledgement by which the insured, in signing the
form, attests to the fact that GEICO has communicated the necessary information
to enable the insured to make an intelligent decision regarding the various
coverages offered.  We therefore hold GEICO "intelligibly advised"
Goodson of the nature of UIM coverage.  This holding is further supported by the
fact that it appears undisputed that Goodson personally completed the form and by
the trial court's findings regarding Goodson's education and level of
sophistication.  See  Floyd v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 367 S.C.
253, 263, 626 S.E.2d 6, 12 (2005) (stating that in requiring the insured to
personally mark, make selections, and sign the form, "the Legislature
apparently recognized that an insured person who is required to personally
complete an offer form inevitably will find it necessary to seek further
explanation from the insurance agent when he or she is unable to complete the
form due to a lack of knowledge or understanding of the concepts of UM and UIM
coverages");[3] Croft v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 365 S.C. 402, 420, 618 S.E.2d 909, 918
(2005) ("[E]vidence of the insured[']s knowledge or level of
sophistication is relevant and admissible when analyzing, under Wannamaker,
whether an insurer intelligibly advised the insured of the nature of the
optional . . . UIM coverage.").

3. We disagree with
Goodson's argument that the absence of specific premiums corresponding to the
listed coverage limits amounts to a failure to satisfy the requirement that an
insurer, when offering UIM coverage, advise its insureds that optional
coverages are available for an additional premium. 

As the trial court
noted, GEICO provided a method by which Goodson could have determined the
premium for a specific set of coverage limits, namely, he could have called
GEICO at its customer service telephone number for a quote.  Goodson's only
challenge to this rationale is that GEICO should not have "put the onus on
its customer to contact it for specific premiums" because it had the
necessary information to provide specific quotes for his vehicles given the
fact that his liability limits were the statutory minimums, and he fails to
explain why it is unduly burdensome to expect customers to call their insurers
for specific premiums.  We agree with the trial court that Goodson had the sophistication
to avail himself of the means provided by GEICO to obtain a precise quote for a
desired level of UIM coverage.  See Grinnell, 389 S.C. at 357-58,
698 S.E.2d at 800 ("A meaningful offer of additional UM and UIM [coverage]
makes as certain as possible that an insured has actual knowledge of his
options with respect to such coverages and is therefore able to make an
informed decision with respect to this desired coverage.").

4. Because we hold
that GEICO's offer of UIM coverage was sufficient under Wannamaker, we
need not address Goodson's argument challenging the trial court's finding that
GEICO was entitled to a conclusive presumption under section 38-77-350 that
Goodson made a knowing decision to reject UIM coverage.  See Futch v. McAllister
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling that, if the determination of a
particular issue is dispositive of an appeal, the appellate court need not
review the remaining issues); Weeks v. McMillan, 291 S.C. 287, 292,
353 S.E.2d 289, 292 (Ct. App.1987) ("Where a decision is based on alternative grounds, either of which independent of the other
is sufficient to support it, the decision will not be
reversed even if one of the grounds is erroneous.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF,
WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

[1]  We decide this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.

[2]  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wannamaker,
291 S.C. 518, 354 S.E.2d 555 (1987).

[3]  We note that the conclusive presumption of a
meaningful offer of UIM coverage now attaches even if the form "has been
completed by an insurance producer or representative of the insurer" as
long as it is the form promulgated by the Department and "is signed by the
named insured."  S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-350(B) (Supp. 2010).