Strickland v. Kinard

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Daniel
Strickland and Mary Formby, Appellants,

v.

Glen Kinard
d/b/a Town & Country of Hampton, Respondent.

Appeal From Allendale County

Walter H. Sanders, Jr., Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-365

Submitted June 1, 2011 – Filed June 30,
2011   

AFFIRMED

Leo A. Dryer, Jr., of Columbia, for
Appellants. 

Daniel Webster Williams, of Barnwell, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Daniel
Strickland and Mary Formby (collectively Appellants) purchased a car from Glen
Kinard, d/b/a Town & Country of Hampton (Kinard).  After Kinard repossessed
the vehicle, Appellants sued.  They appeal the master-in-equity's order
dismissing their case and awarding costs of suit to Kinard, arguing the master erred
in (1) declining to find Kinard's contract did not comply with the Consumer
Protection Code, (2) ignoring Kinard's disposition of the vehicle, (3)
condoning Kinard's repossession of the vehicle by finding the vehicle was
uninsured and in peril, (4) accepting Kinard's proposed order after the established
deadline, (5) entering its order upon a misunderstanding of the facts in the
case, and (6) impugning Formby's credibility.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following
authorities: 

1. As to the contract's
compliance with the Consumer Protection Code and consequent creation of a
security interest in Kinard's favor:  S.C. Code Ann. § 37-2-407 (2002)
(providing in a consumer credit sale, the seller "may take a security
interest in the property sold"); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-1-201(37) (2003)
(defining "security interest" as "an interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an
obligation"); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-103(a) & (b) (2003) (explaining
when a buyer and a seller agree the goods the buyer purchases from the seller
will be collateral against the unpaid portion of their purchase price, the
seller has a purchase-money security interest in those goods); S.C. Code Ann. §
36-9-203(a) (2003) ("A security interest attaches to collateral when it
becomes enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral . . . .");
S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-203(b) (2003) (stating a seller's security interest is
enforceable "only if:  (1) value has been given; (2) the debtor has rights
in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a
secured party; and (3) . . . (A) the debtor has authenticated a security
agreement that provides a description of the collateral."). 

2. As to Kinard's
disposition of the vehicle, with regard to the master's use of the term
"non traditional repossession" instead of "non judicial self
help repossession":  Noisette v.
Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 58, 403 S.E.2d
122, 123-24 (1991) (precluding an appellate court from vacating a trial court's
judgment f or lack of specificity when the trial court adequately stated the
basis for its ruling). 

3.  As to Kinard's
disposition of the vehicle, with regard to whether
Kinard sent Strickland a right-to-redeem letter:  Dixon v. Dixon, 362
S.C. 388, 399, 608 S.E.2d 849, 854 (2005) (holding an issue raised for the
first time in a post-trial motion such as one pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, is
not preserved for appellate review). 

4. As to Kinard's
disposition of the vehicle, with regard to whether the disposal was "commercially
reasonable":  In re Michael H., 360 S.C. 540, 546, 602 S.E.2d 729,
732 (2004) ("An issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal.  In
order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be raised to and ruled upon by
the trial court."). 

5.  As to whether the
master erred in failing to award Appellants damages for conversion:  Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR ("Ordinarily, no point
will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of the issues on
appeal.").

6. As to Appellants' remaining issues:  Rule 208(b)(1)(D), SCACR (requiring arguments in
appellate briefs to include citations to legal authority); Eaddy v.
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., 355 S.C. 154, 164, 584 S.E.2d 390, 396 (Ct.
App. 2003) ("[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting
authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not preserved for our
review.").[2] 

AFFIRMED. 

FEW, C.J., and
KONDUROS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur. 

[1]  We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

[2] We feel compelled to comment on Appellants'
contention that the master misunderstood the facts.  Although, for the reasons
set forth in this opinion, we affirm the master's decision Kinard does not owe
money to Appellants, to whatever extent this decision may later be used as
evidence Appellants owe Kinard a debt, we do not believe the record supports a
determination that Appellants owe Kinard $2,000.