In the Matter of Kevin Paschal

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

In the Matter
of the Care and Treatment of Kevin Paschal, Appellant.

Appeal From Aiken County

Thomas A. Russo, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-142

Submitted February 1, 2011 – Filed April
5, 2011

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle C. DuRant, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J.
Shupe, and Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, all of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Kevin Paschal appeals his commitment to
the South Carolina Department of Mental Health as a sexually violent predator. 
On appeal, Paschal contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
directed verdict because the State failed to prove his diagnosis of pedophilia.
 We affirm.[1]

A sexually
violent predator is defined in the Sexually Violent Predator Act (the Act) as "a
person who: (a) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (b)
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure
facility for long-term control, care, and treatment."  S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-30(1)
(Supp. 2010).  "Mental abnormality" is defined as "a mental
condition affecting a person's emotional or volitional capacity that
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses."  S.C. Code
Ann. § 44-48-30(3) (2010).  The phrase "likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence" is defined as a "propensity to commit acts of sexual
violence . . . of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of
others."  S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-30(9) (2010).

"When ruling on a motion
for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence
of evidence, not its weight." State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292,
625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006).  "When reviewing a denial of a directed
verdict, [an appellate court] views the evidence and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."  Id.  A mental health
expert's clinical opinion is sufficient, absent any other evidence, to support
the trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict.  See In
re Care & Treatment of Matthews, 345 S.C. 638, 646-48, 550 S.E.2d 311,
315 (2001) (holding a mental health expert's clinical opinion of whether or not
the accused should undergo in-patient treatment was sufficient by itself to
affirm a denial of directed verdict).

Here, the State produced
evidence that Paschal met both elements of sexually violent predator as defined
in the Act.  A forensic psychiatrist testified Paschal's conviction of criminal
sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree was a sexually violent
offense.  Additionally, the forensic psychiatrist testified Paschal suffered
from paraphilia not otherwise specified, which made him likely to engage in
acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term
care, control, and treatment.  Thus,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence
supported submitting the case to the jury.  

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and
KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

 

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.