Ritter v. Hurst

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

William Ritter, Respondent,

v.

William Hurst,
et al., Defendants,

Of whom William
Hurst is the Appellant.

Appeal From Aiken County

 Doyet A. Early, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-152

Submitted April 1, 2011 – Filed April 12,
2011   

AFFIRMED

Brian Austin Katonak, of Aiken, for Appellant.

Marsha M. Banks, of Aiken, for Respondent.

PER
CURIAM: William Hurst
appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment.  Hurst argues the following: (1) the trial court lacked
jurisdiction because of the failure to properly publish the summons; (2) the
trial court lacked jurisdiction because Hurst did not receive proper notice of
the hearing; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to grant relief under
Rule 60(b), SCRCP, for Hurst's excusable neglect.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.  As to whether
the trial court lacked jurisdiction because of improper service of process: Fin.
Fed. Credit, Inc. v. Brown, 384 S.C. 555, 564, 683 S.E.2d 486, 491 (2009) ("[S]ervice
[of process] confers personal jurisdiction."); Bakala v. Bakala,
352 S.C. 612, 629, 576 S.E.2d 156, 165 (2003) ("Objections to personal
jurisdiction, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, are waived unless raised."); Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 339 S.C. 406, 412, 529 S.E.2d 543, 546
(2000) ("[A]n issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but
must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved for
appellate review."). 

2. As to
whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction because of improper notice: Staubes,
339 S.C. at 412, 529 S.E.2d at 546 ("[A]n issue cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial
court to be preserved for appellate review.").

3. As to
whether the trial court erred in denying Hurst's motion for relief from
judgment: BB & T v. Taylor, 369 S.C. 548, 552, 633 S.E.2d 501, 503
(2006) ("The movant in a Rule 60(b) motion has the burden of presenting evidence
proving the facts essential to entitle her to relief."); id. at
551, 633 S.E.2d at 502-03 (holding the decision to grant or deny a motion made
pursuant to Rule 60(b) is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the
appellate standard of review is limited to determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion); Gainey v. Gainey, 382 S.C. 414, 423, 675 S.E.2d
792, 797 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding an abuse of discretion occurs when the order
of the court is controlled by an error of law or when the order is based on
factual findings that are without evidentiary support).  

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.