Smith v. SGM Moonglo, Inc.

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Edwin O. Smith
and Roger M. Caldwell, co-personal representatives of the estate of Marjorie
H. Smith, Respondent,

v.

SGM Moonglo,
Inc., Appellant.

 

Appeal From Lexington County

  Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-151

Heard March 9, 2011 – Filed April 12, 2011   

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AFFIRMED

__________

Robert L. Jackson, of Columbia, for Appellant.

James Ross Snell, of Lexington, for Respondent.

PER
CURIAM:  This case involves a
restrictive covenant in a deed from Marjorie Smith,[1] the original grantor, to
SGM Moonglo, Inc., the fourth grantee.  The deed prohibited the sale of alcohol
on the land.  When SGM began selling alcohol on the land, Smith sought an
injunction enforcing the covenant.  SGM appeals the circuit court's order enjoining
it from selling alcohol.  It argues (1) the prohibition on selling alcohol is a
condition of sale rather than a restrictive covenant, (2) Smith did not have
standing to enforce the covenant, (3) the language of the covenant was
ambiguous, and (4) Smith was unqualified to testify to diminution in her
property value.  SGM also alleges error in various factual findings by the
circuit court.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether the prohibition is a condition of sale or a restrictive
covenant: Bennett v. Investors Title Ins. Co., 370 S.C. 578, 599, 635
S.E.2d 649, 660 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding appellants abandoned an issue on
appeal when they failed to cite any case law for a proposition and made only conclusory
arguments in support); Rule 208(b)(1)(D), SCACR (stating that each
"particular issue to be addressed shall be set forth in distinctive type,
followed by discussion and citations of authority") (emphasis
added). 

2. As to whether Smith had standing to enforce the restrictive covenant: McLeod
v. Baptiste, 315 S.C. 246, 247, 433 S.E.2d 834, 835 (1993) ("[T]he
grantor lacks standing to enforce a covenant against a remote grantee when the
grantor no longer owns real property which would benefit from the enforcement
of that restrictive covenant."). 

3. As to whether the deed language was ambiguous: Taylor v. Lindsey,
332 S.C. 1, 4, 498 S.E.2d 862, 863-64 (1998) ("Words of a restrictive
covenant will be given the common, ordinary meaning attributed to them at the
time of their execution.  Restrictive covenants are contractual in nature, so
that the paramount rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the parties as determined from the whole
document.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

4. As to Smith's qualification to testify about property value diminution: AJG
Holdings, LLC v. Dunn, 382 S.C. 43, 51, 674 S.E.2d 505, 509 (Ct. App. 2009)
("Generally, a restrictive covenant will be enforced regardless of the
amount of damage that will result from the breach and even though there is no
substantial monetary damage to the complainant by reason of the violation . . .
.  The mere breach alone is grounds for injunctive relief.").

5. As to the alleged error in factual findings: Eaddy v. Smurfit-Stone
Container Corp., 355 S.C. 154, 164, 584 S.E.2d 390, 396 (Ct. App. 2003)
("This court has noted that short, conclusory statements made without
supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not preserved
for our review.").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] Smith was the original plaintiff; however, she died during the pendency of this
appeal.  Her personal representatives were substituted as parties to this
litigation.