SCDSS v. U.J.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina
Department of Social Services, Respondent,

   v.

U.J. and P.W., Defendants,

Of whom P.W. is
the Appellant.

In the interest of one minor child under the age of 18.

Appeal From Charleston County

Judy L. McMahon, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-169

Submitted April 1, 2011 – Filed April 19,
2011   

AFFIRMED

Thomas L. Harper, Jr., of Charleston, for
Appellant.

J. Corbitt Hinson, III, of North
Charleston, for Respondent.

Carolyn Chaite Berlin, of Mount Pleasant,
for Guardian Ad Litem.

PER CURIAM:  P.W.
(Father) appeals the family court's May 28, 2010 permanence planning order
adopting termination of parental rights (TPR) as the permanent plan for the
child.  On appeal, Father contends the family court erred in failing to find a
compelling reason to select a permanence plan other than TPR.  We affirm.[1]

 "In appeals from the family court, the appellate
court has the authority to find the facts in accordance with its view of the
preponderance of the evidence."  Ex parte Morris, 367 S.C. 56, 61,
624 S.E.2d 649, 652 (2006).  "This broad scope of review does not,
however, require the appellate court to disregard the findings of the family
court."  Id.  "This degree of deference is especially true in
cases involving the welfare and best interests of a minor child."  Id. at 62, 624 S.E.2d at 652.       

"If the [family] court
approves a plan that is not reunification with the parents, custody or
guardianship with a fit and willing relative, or [TPR], the [family] court must
find compelling reasons for approval of the plan and that the plan is in the child's
best interests."  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1700(C) (Supp. 2010). 

Here, no compelling reason
supports the family court's approval of a permanent plan other than TPR.  Father's
incarceration prevented reunification prior to the child's spending over
eighteen months in foster care, and no viable relatives were available to care
for the child.  Additionally, evidence supported the family court's finding TPR
would be in the child's best interest.  At the time of the trial, the child
would have had to remain in foster care for at least another sixteen months
awaiting Father's release from prison, even though child does not know Father. 
In comparison, Child's foster parents are interested in adoption now and
Child's assessment revealed he is a good candidate for adoption.  The child's
therapist testified waiting for Father's release from prison would place child
at a greater risk for social and emotional problems and attachment disorder. 

Accordingly, the family court
did not err in adopting the permanency planning order of TPR. 

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, J.,
KONDUROS, J., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.