Dippel v. Fowler

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Kenneth Dippel
& Kimber Fowler, Appellants,

v.

Claudus Eugene
Fowler, Respondent.

Appeal From Horry County

Cynthia G. Howe, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No.  2011-UP-109 

Submitted March 1, 2011 – Filed March 16, 2011

AFFIRMED

Kenneth Dippel and Kimber Fowler, of Loris, pro se.

Claudus Eugene Fowler, of Loris, pro se.

PER CURIAM: Kenneth
Dippel and Kimber Fowler, pro se, appeal the master-in-equity's order
dismissing their actions for civil contempt and trespass against Claudus Eugene
Fowler and finding Claudus has an easement by prior use.  Dippel and Kimber
argue the trial court erred in (1) finding an implied easement by prior use
existed, (2) dismissing Dippel's claims for lack of standing, and (3)
rescinding an earlier order enjoining Claudus from travelling on Dolly Lane and
subsequently dismissing Kimber's claims as moot.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1) and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the
master erred in finding Claudus holds an implied easement by prior use: In
re Estate of Timmerman, 331 S.C. 455, 460, 502 S.E.2d 920, 922 (Ct. App.
1998) (holding when a party receives an order that grants certain relief not
previously contemplated or presented to the trial court, the aggrieved party
must move, pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, to alter or amend the judgment in
order to preserve the issue for appeal). 

2. As to whether master
erred in dismissing Dippel's trespass and contempt claims because he lacked standing: Ex parte Morris, 367 S.C. 56, 62, 624 S.E.2d 649, 652 (2006)
("[T]o have standing, a litigant must have a personal stake in the subject
matter of the litigation.  One must be a real party in interest, i.e., a party
who has a real, material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the
action, as opposed to one who has only a nominal or technical interest in the
action."). 

3. As to whether master
erred in rescinding a prior order enjoining Claudus from using Dolly Lane and
subsequently dismissing Kimber's contempt and trespass claims: Timmerman,
331 S.C. at 460, 502 S.E.2d at 922 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding when a party
receives an order that grants certain relief not previously contemplated or
presented to the trial court, the aggrieved party must move, pursuant to Rule
59(e), SCRCP, to alter or amend the judgment in order to preserve the issue for
appeal). 

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J.,
KONDUROS, J., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.