Chisolm v. Chisolm

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Leon Chisolm,
James Roosevelt Chisolm, Doris G. Fladger, Robert Chisolm, Florence Chisolm,
Alice C. Jenkins, Sadie Y. McDonald, Martha Pryor, Patricia Millian, Margaret
E. Warren, Andrew K. Chisolm, Edrina L. Wilson, Carl Chisolm, Lawrence
Chisolm, Roosevelt Chisolm, II, Louis Chisolm, Eddie Chisolm, Leroy Chisolm,
and Tommy Chisolm; Plaintiffs,

Of Whom Leon
Chisolm, James Roosevelt Chisolm, Robert Chisolm, Florence Chisolm, Alice C.
Jenkins, Sadie Y. McDonald, Martha Pryor, Patricia Millian, Margaret E.
Warren, Andrew K. Chisolm, Edrina L. Wilson, Carl Chisolm, Lawrence Chisolm,
Roosevelt Chisolm, II, Louis Chisolm, Eddie Chisolm, Leroy Chisolm, and Tommy
Chisolm are Appellants,

v.

Mary Frances S.
Chisolm, William Chisolm, Emily C. Campbell, Debra C. Murphy, Allie C.
Frazier, Cora C. Brown, Cordell Chisolm, Charles Chisolm, Jr., Phillip
Chisolm, Anthony Chisolm, David Chisolm, Leonard Chisolm, and Levy Chisolm, Respondents.

Appeal From Charleston County

Mikell R. Scarborough, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-011

Submitted January 1, 2011 – Filed January
24, 2011

DISMISSED AND REMANDED

Barry I. Baker and Harold Alan Oberman, both
of Charleston, for Appellants.

Willie Bruce Heyward, of N. Charleston,
for Respondents.

PER CURIAM:  Leon Chisolm et al. (Appellants) appeal the order of
the master-in-equity denying Appellants' request to issue a deed to a parcel of
property in accordance with an order from 1982.  On appeal, Appellants argue:
(1) the failure of the master-in-equity to issue a deed pursuant to the 1982
order is a clerical mistake pursuant to Rule 60(a), SCRCP, correctable at any
time by the court and (2) the master-in-equity erred in dismissing Appellants'
case before hearing the motion to set aside the entry of default made by Mary Frances S. Chisolm et al. (Respondents). 

We decline to
reach the merits of this appeal and find this matter to be premature.  Due to
the unusual posture of this case and the fact that the record does not indicate
that a ruling has been made on Respondents' motion to set aside the entry of
default, we dismiss[1] this appeal as interlocutory. See S.C.
Code Ann. § 14-3-330(1) (1977) (stating "no appeal [may] be taken until
final judgment is entered"); Ex parte Wilson, 367 S.C. 7, 12,
625 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2005) ("As a general rule, only final judgments
are appealable . . . .  Any judgment or decree, leaving some further act to be
done by the court before the rights of the parties are determined, is interlocutory and not final.") (internal citation omitted).  In the current posture of
this case, while Appellants did not prevail on the merits of their motions, default
has nonetheless been entered in their favor, which is inconsistent with the
denial of relief in their motions.  Accordingly, we cannot address the merits
raised on the summary denial of a Rule 59(e) motion.

We therefore dismiss the
appeal and remand the case to the master-in-equity to rule on Respondents'
motion to set aside the entry of default[2] and to conduct such other proceedings as may be necessary to enter final
judgment.

THOMAS, PIEPER,
and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.

[2] We note Appellants
specifically asked the master-in-equity to address the issue of the pending
motion to set aside the entry of default but the master-in-equity failed to
act.