State v. Brooks

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Altony Brooks, Appellant.

Appeal From Berkeley County

Judge Kristi L. Harrington, Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2010-UP-570 

Submitted December 1, 2010 – Filed
December 31, 2010

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H.
Carter, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief
Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Altony
Brooks appeals his conviction for aiding a suspect's escape from police
custody, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict.  We affirm.[1]

"When ruling on a motion
for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or
nonexistence of evidence, not its weight." State v. Weston, 367
S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006).  A reviewing court must uphold the
denial of a directed verdict where "there is any direct evidence or
substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of
the accused . . . ."  Id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d
at 648.  The reviewing court "views the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."  Id. at
292, 625 S.E.2d at 648. 

Under section
16-9-420 of the South Carolina Code (2003), "[w]hoever aids or assists a
prisoner in escaping or attempting to
escape from an officer . . . shall be punished by imprisonment
. . . ."  Generally, "[a] defendant
may not be convicted of a criminal offense unless the State proves beyond a reasonable
doubt that he acted with the criminal intent . . . required for a particular
offense."  State v. Fennell, 340 S.C. 266, 271, 531 S.E.2d 512, 515
(2000).  "The intent with which an act is done
denotes a state of mind, and can be proved only by expressions or conduct,
considered in the light of the given circumstances."  State v. Tuckness,
257 S.C. 295, 299, 185 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971).  Whether a defendant
acted with the requisite criminal intent is ordinarily a question of fact for
the jury, unless no evidence of criminal intent exists.  Id.

Viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, the State presented direct and substantial
circumstantial evidence that Brooks intended to help a suspect escape police
custody.  While police officers attempted to handcuff the suspect, Brooks accosted
and pushed the officers, interfering with their attempts to arrest the
suspect.  The suspect escaped, and one of the officers began to assess how to
pursue the suspect.  Brooks immediately attacked that officer, punching him
twice.  Because of Brooks's conduct, the officer was unable to pursue the
suspect.  Therefore, the State presented direct and substantial circumstantial
evidence reasonably tending to prove that Brooks intended to help the suspect
escape police custody.  Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Brooks's
motion for a directed verdict.

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS, PIEPER, and
GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.