Erma L. v. Linda D.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Erma L. J. and
Joe J., Jr., Respondents,

v.

Linda D. W., Appellant.

In the interest of two minor children.

Appeal From Georgetown County

Jan B. Holmes, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-506

Submitted November 1, 2010 – Filed
November 12, 2010   

AFFIRMED

C. Carter Elliott, Jr., and Robert Lucas
Lumpkin, Jr., both of Georgetown, for Appellant.

Ronald James Talbert, of Andrews, for
Respondents.

Louis R. Morant, of Georgetown, for
Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Linda D. W. (Mother) appeals from the family court's order terminating her
parental rights to her minor children (Children).  Mother argues the family court erred in terminating her parental rights pursuant to sections
63-7-2570(1) (based on the severity of abuse the home cannot be made safe
within twelve months) and 63-7-2570(9) (the physical abuse of a child by a
parent resulted in the death of the child and the parent was convicted of
murder) of the South Carolina Code (2010).  Mother also appeals the family
court's finding termination
of parental rights (TPR) was in Children's best interests.  We disagree.[1] 

1.  We affirm the
family court's finding that based on the severity of the abuse Mother inflicted
on her oldest child, it is not reasonably likely Mother's home can be made safe
within twelve months.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (2010) (stating the family
court may order TPR upon finding one or more of eleven statutory grounds is
satisfied and also finding TPR is in the best interest of the child); §
63-7-2570(1) ("The child . . . in the home has been harmed as defined in [s]ection
63-7-20, and because of the severity or repetition of the abuse or neglect, it
is not reasonably likely that the home can be made safe within twelve months.  In
determining the likelihood that the home can be made safe, the parent's
previous abuse or neglect of the child or another child in the home may be
considered."); S.C Code Ann. § 63-7-20(4) (2010) (stating "child
abuse or neglect" occurs when the parent "inflicts or allows to be
inflicted upon the child physical or mental injury or engages in acts or
omissions which present a substantial risk of physical or mental injury to the
child").

2.  We affirm the family
court's finding that Mother's physical abuse of her oldest child resulted in
the death of that child and Mother pled guilty to second-degree murder in North
Carolina.  See § 63-7-2570(9) ("The physical abuse of a child of
the parent resulted in the death . . . of that child and the abuse is the act
for which the parent has been convicted of or pled guilty . . . to committing,
aiding, abetting, conspiring to commit, or soliciting an offense against the
person as provided for in Title 16, Chapter 3, criminal domestic violence as
defined in Section 16-25-20, criminal domestic violence of a high and
aggravated nature as defined in Section 16-25-65, or the common law offense of
assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature.").

 3.  Despite Mother's arguments to the
contrary, we find clear and convincing evidence supports the finding that
termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of Children.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010) (explaining when the child's
interests and the parental rights conflict, the child's interests shall
prevail); Charleston County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. King, 369 S.C. 96,
105, 631 S.E.2d 239, 244 (2006) ("When reviewing the family court
decision, appellate courts may make their own conclusions of whether DSS proved
by clear and convincing evidence that parental rights should be
terminated."); Charleston County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Jackson,
368 S.C. 87, 95, 627 S.E.2d 765, 770 (stating despite the appellate court's
broad scope of review, it should not necessarily disregard the findings of the
family court, which was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses and to assign weight to their testimony); Id. at 102, 627
S.E.2d at 774 (declaring the best interests of the children are the
paramount consideration in a TPR case).

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., KONDUROS,
J., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.