State v. McLaughlin

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Wayne McLaughlin, Appellant.

Appeal From Marion County

Howard P. King, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-503

Submitted October 1, 2010 – Filed November
12, 2010   

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H.
Carter, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief
Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley
W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, all of Columbia;
and Solicitor Edgar L. Clements, III, of Florence, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Wayne
McLaughlin was convicted of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and
was sentenced to two concurrent terms of twenty-five years.  McLaughlin
appeals, asserting the trial judge erred in (1) admitting incriminating
evidence at trial based on the arresting officer’s failure to advise him of his Miranda[1] rights, and (2) refusing to remove and replace a sleeping juror.  We affirm[2] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1),
SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1. As to whether the trial
judge erred by admitting incriminating evidence at trial when the arresting
officer failed to advise McLaughlin of his Miranda rights while he was
in police custody:  State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 642, 541 S.E.2d 837, 840 (2001) (noting that,
generally, a motion in limine is not a final determination and a
contemporaneous objection must be made when the evidence is introduced at
trial, unless the ruling on the motion in limine is made
immediately prior to the introduction of the evidence in question);  Doe v. U.S., 487 U.S.
201, 211 (1988) (providing, “[i]t is the extortion of information from the
accused, the attempt to force him to disclose the contents of his own mind,
that implicates the Self-Incrimination Clause”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted);  Id. at 210 n. 9 (implying
that being forced to surrender a key to a strongbox containing incriminating
documents would not amount to testimonial communication).

2.  As
to whether the trial judge erred in refusing to remove and replace a sleeping
juror:  State v. Smith, 338 S.C. 66, 74, 525 S.E.2d 263, 267 (Ct. App.
1999) (noting a showing of prejudice must be made to warrant relief in juror
misconduct cases); Id. at 73, 525 S.E.2d at 266-67 (finding where the
trial judge concluded the juror was awake and listening with her eyes closed,
the trial judge made the requisite factual finding regarding whether the juror
was asleep and need take no further action); Id. at 75, 525 S.E.2d at
268 (holding, because defendant bore the burden to show the juror was actually
asleep, failure to request direct examination of the juror waived any complaint
on appeal).

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and
HUFF and GEATHERS, JJ., confirm.

[1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

[2] We decide this case without oral argument
pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.