Cartee v. Countryman

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Corrie R.
Cartee, as personal representative for the Estate of Gene Edward Cartee, Sr.,
deceased, Appellant,

v.

David Mark
Countryman, M.D.; Walter S. Revell, Jr., M.D.; Piedmont Surgical Associates
of York County, P.A.; Amisub of South Carolina, Inc. d/b/a Piedmont Medical
Center; Tenet Healthcare Corp., d/b/a Piedmont Healthcare System and Piedmont
Medical Center; Nathaniel C. Edwards, M.D.; Thomas V. Johnson, M.D.; Harry E.
Hicklin, III, M.D., The Sanger Clinic, P.A.; Rajesh Hari Kedar, M.D.;
Metrolina Medical Associates, P.A.; and Robert Paul Neueton Mingus, M.D.;,
Defandants,/Oof whom David Mark Countryman, M.D.; and Piedmont Surgical
Associates of York County, P.A.and Rajesh Hari Kedar, M.D.; Metrolina Medical
Associates, P.A.;and Robert Paul Neueton Mingus, M.D. are the Respondents.

Appeal From York County

 S. Jackson Kimball, III, Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-425

Heard June 16, 2010 – Filed October 6,
2010

REVERSED

Benjamin Mabry and Charles L. Henshaw, Jr., both of Columbia, for
Appellant

Ashby W. Davis, , Steven A. Snyder, David L. Williford, Collie W.
Lehn, Jr., all of Greenville, Edward G. Smith and H. Spencer King ,both of
Spartanburg, Robert H. Hood and Mary Agnes Craig, both of Charleston for
Respondents.

PER CURIAM: In this medical malpractice case, the estate of Gene Edward
Cartee Sr., (Cartee) appeals the special referee's grant of summary judgment in
favor of multiple respondents.  We reverse.

FACTS

On December 19, 2002, Gene Edward Cartee
Sr. (Cartee) arrived at the emergency department of Piedmont Medical Center of
Rock Hill, suffering from rectal bleeding.  He was admitted under the care of
internist Maria Redmond, M.D., an employee of Metrolina Medical Assoc., P.A.  Redmond
consulted gastroenterologist Larry Pennington, M.D. who conducted a colonoscopy
on December 20, discovering two cancerous masses in Cartee's large intestine. 
Because one of masses appeared to completely block the intestine, Redmon and
Pennington consulted general surgeon David Mark Countryman, M.D.  After
examination and review of Cartee's medical history, Countryman recommended an
abdominal colectomy because of active colon bleeding and because one of the
cancerous masses threatened to completely block the colon, both conditions
Countryman opined were life-threatening.  Accordingly, the surgery was
scheduled for December 23.

On
December 21, Rajesh Hari Kedar, M.D. took over the internal medicine aspects of
Cartee's care from Redmond and conducted a review of Cartee's pre-op EKG, and
lab results.  Kedar stated that because Cartee indicated he had no chest pains,
shortness of breath, chest pressure, or symptoms of angina, he did not
recommend a pre-op cardiac stress test.  The following day, December 22,
Richard Tarvers, M.D. conducted a pre-op anesthesia evaluation.  Then again, on
the morning of surgery, Tarvers's partner Dr. Mingus evaluated Cartee and served
as the anesthesiologist for the colectomy.  Neither Kedar, Countryman, Mingus,
Redmon or Tarvers indicated Cartee needed further cardiac work-ups or testing
prior to surgery, or voiced any concern to warrant postponing the surgery.  On
December 23, Countryman successfully removed nearly all of Cartee's colon.

On
December 26, Cartee developed atrial fibrillation (irregular heartbeat) and as
a result cardiologist Nathaniel Edwards, M.D., was consulted to treat the
condition.  On the evening of December 29, Cartee suffered a heart
attack.  The following morning, Cartee apparently had either a second heart
attack or a continuation of the same "coronary event" which caused
the first heart attack.  As a result of this "coronary event," Harry
E. Hicklin, III, M.D. conducted an emergent catheterization by performing a balloon
angioplasty on the anterior descending artery and inserting a stent.  On
January 3, 2003, Dr. Edwards performed a second catheterization, placing a stent
in the circumflex. 

On
January 7, 2003, Cartee died of severe coronary artery disease.  Corrie Cartee,
the personal representative of Cartee's estate brought this medical malpractice
claim against seven doctors involved in Cartee's care and their respective
professional associations.  On July 11, 2008, the trial court entered an order
granting summary judgment in favor of Countryman and his professional
association Piedmont Surgical Associates.  Subsequently, on August 14, 2008,
the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Kedar and Mingus as well. 
Cartee now appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to
Countryman, Kedar, Mingus, and their respective professional associations.  On
December 29, 2008, this court granted a motion to consolidate the appeals. 

ISSUE

Did the trial court err in granting
summary judgment because Cartee did not create a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the respondents deviated from the generally recognized standard
of care and caused Cartee's injury and death?[1] 

STANDARD
OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy,
"[t]he purpose of [which] is to expedite the disposition of cases which do
not require the services of a fact finder."  Singleton v. Sherer,
377 S.C. 185, 198, 659, S.E.2d 196, 205 (Ct. App. 2008).  Rule 56(c), SCRCP
provides that summary judgment is proper when: "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law."  On appeal, an appellate court applies the same standard as the
trial court under Rule 56(c), and likewise must view the evidence and all
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Fleming
v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002). 

LAW/ANALYSIS

In order to establish a genuine issue of
material fact sufficient to overcome summary judgment a plaintiff in a medical
malpractice case must provide evidence of (1) a generally recognized and
accepted standard of care, and (2) a departure from that standard by the
defendant.  David v. McLeod Reg'l Med. Ctr., 367 S.C. 242, 247, 626
S.E.2d 1, 4 (2006).  In this regard, a plaintiff "must provide expert
testimony to establish both the required standard of care and the defendant['s]
failure to conform to that standard[] . . . ."  Id. at 248, 626
S.E.2d at 4.  However, to overcome summary judgment, the non-moving party need
only present a scintilla of evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact.  Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Tolbert, 387 S.C. 280, 283, 692 S.E.2d 523, 524
(2010); Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., Inc., 381 S.C. 326, 330, 673
S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009). 

In this case, Cartee avers, as to each
respondent, the trial court erred in (1) finding no genuine issue of material
fact as to a recognized standard of care, (2) finding no genuine issue of
material fact tending to establishing a deviation from that standard of care,
and (3) finding Cartee's expert, Vasquez, did not testify as to proximate cause
with the requisite degree of certainty.

Upon
review of the record, pleadings, affidavits, and Vasquez's deposition, we
believe Cartee presented a scintilla of evidence sufficient to withstand
summary judgment.  As to the first element, Vasquez's deposition and affidavit opined
that the appropriate standard of care is one common to all physicians and
required the respondents to conduct further evaluation and testing of Cartee's
cardiac functionality.  Whether this standard is appropriate under the
circumstances, or whether some other standard is imposed by virtue of being a
specialist in a particular field is an issue of fact. 

Similarly,
Vasquez's affidavit and deposition present a scintilla of evidence that the
respondents deviated from the standard of care by failing to consider or notice
certain "risk factors" and make further inquiry into Cartee's cardiac
condition.  Whether these factors were known to the respondents at the time, or
whether each doctor's failure to consult a cardiologist or investigate further
amounts to a deviation from Vasquez's alleged standard of care are issues of
fact.

Finally, as to the issue of proximate cause,
Vasquez's affidavit states that in his opinion Cartee's death "most
probably could have been prevented, had [he] received . . . treatment meeting
the standard of care."  Further, Vasquez opined that certain risk
factors should have provided sufficient indication of the need for the pre-op
cardiac evaluation, which would have ultimately led to a different course of
treatment and/or action.  We find that in the light most favorable to
Cartee, this suffices as a mere scintilla of evidence sufficient to withstand
summary judgment.  We recognize the depositions of the attending
cardiologists diverge from Vasquez's testimony as to what tests would have been
conducted and how the course of treatment would or would not have altered had
the request for a cardiac evaluation been made; however, Cartee is only
required to present a scintilla of evidence to survive the motion. 
Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For
the reasons stated above, the ruling of the trial court is

REVERSED.

FEW, C.J., THOMAS and PIEPER JJ.,
concur.

[1]  We note Cartee
also makes the following arguments pertaining specifically to respondent
Mingus:  (1) Did the trial court erroneously base its grant of summary judgment
on a ground not raised by the defendant's motion? (2) Did the trial court err
in granting summary judgment on the grounds that Cartee's expert did not
testify on the issue of proximate cause with the requisite certainty? (3) Did
the trial court err in holding Cartee's expert testimony was not sufficient to
establish a standard of care by an anesthesiologist to ask for a pre-surgical
heart evaluation?  However, in light of our disposition, we need not address
these issues.