State v. Evans

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jeffrey S.
Evans, Appellant.

Appeal From Anderson County

 Alexander S. Macaulay, Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-464

Submitted October 1, 2010 – Filed October
25, 2010   

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle C. DuRant, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and
Assistant Attorney General Julie M. Thames, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
Christina T. Adams, of Anderson, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Jeffrey S. Evans appeals his convictions
for armed robbery and possession of a knife during the commission of a violent
offense.  On appeal, Evans argues the trial court erred in denying his motions
for a mistrial and directed verdict.  We affirm[1] pursuant to
Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1.  As to whether the trial court erred in denying Evans's motion for a
mistrial:  State v. Culbreath, 377 S.C. 326,
331, 659 S.E.2d 268, 271 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Whether to grant or deny a
mistrial motion is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion, and the
court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion
amounting to an error of law. . . .  In order to receive a mistrial, a
defendant must show error and resulting prejudice.").

2.  As to whether the trial court erred in denying Evans's
motion for a directed verdict: S.C. Code Ann. §
16-11-330(A) (2003) (stating armed robbery
occurs when a person commits robbery while armed with a deadly weapon);  State v. Moore, 374 S.C. 468, 476, 649 S.E.2d 84, 88 (Ct. App. 2007)
("Robbery is defined as the felonious or
unlawful taking of money, goods, or other personal property of any value from
the person of another or in his presence by violence or by putting such person
in fear."); Id. at 474, 649
S.E.2d at 86 ("The appellate court may reverse the trial [court]'s denial of a motion for a directed verdict only if there is no evidence to support the [trial
court's] ruling."); Id. at 474, 649 S.E.2d at 87 ("A case should be submitted to
the jury if there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial
evidence that reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused or from which
guilt may be fairly and logically deduced."). 

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, PIEPER, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.