State v. Sanders

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Ricky Darren Sanders, Appellant.

Appeal From Sumter County

Ralph F. Cothran, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-362

Submitted June 1, 2010 – Filed July 12,
2010

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Appellate Defender Elizabeth A.
Franklin-Best, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster,
Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney
General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all
of Columbia, Cecil Kelly Jackson, of Sumter; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Ricky
Darren Sanders appeals his conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC).  We reverse and remand.

FACTS

In 2008, Sanders was tried on
charges of kidnapping and sexually assaulting Olivia in 2002.  McCrea alleged
that while walking home Sanders grabbed her, dragged her into the nearby woods,
and raped her. 

During pretrial motions, the
State sought to exclude McCrea's 1997 conviction for filing a false police
report.  Sanders argued the conviction would be an indication of McCrea's
ability to be truthful.[1]  The court stated: "That doesn't come [in] under the rules," and
after determining the maximum punishment for filing a false police report was
thirty days' imprisonment, the court ruled that because the punishment was less
than a year, "[i]t wouldn't be admissible [even] if it happened
yesterday." 

The jury found Sanders guilty
only on the charge of CSC, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years'
imprisonment.  This appeal followed.

ISSUE

1. Did the trial court
err in excluding the victim's prior conviction for filing a false police
report?[2]

LAW/ANALYSIS

"The admission or
exclusion of evidence is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a manifest
abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice."  State v. Wise,
359 S.C. 14, 21, 596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004).  "An abuse of discretion
occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support
or are controlled by an error of law."  State v. Pagan, 369 S.C.
201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006). 

A witness's prior
conviction involving dishonesty or a false statement is admissible for
impeachment regardless of the punishment.  Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE; State v.
Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526, 544, 552 S.E.2d 300, 310 (2001).  However, the
prior conviction is inadmissible if more than ten years have passed between the
conviction or release from confinement and the testimony, "unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of
the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect."  Rule 609(b), SCRE (emphasis added). 

In this case,
Sanders argued the conviction was an indication of the victim's ability to be
truthful and responsible; however, the trial court indicated that such a
conviction was not admissible under the rules.  The trial court ruled that
because the potential thirty day penalty for the offense was less than one
year, "it wouldn't be admissible [even] if it happened yesterday." 
However, Rule 609(a)(2), clearly states, "evidence that any witness has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment." (emphasis added) 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in ruling the conviction inadmissible because
it carried only a thirty day punishment.  Therefore, we find the trial court
abused its discretion, and in light of the limited physical evidence in this
case, such an error resulted in probable prejudice to Sanders.  See, e.g., Wise,
359 S.C. at 21, 596 S.E.2d at 478 (holding in order to warrant reversal, an
abuse of discretion must be accompanied by probable prejudice).

Furthermore,
although we recognize the conviction is admittedly remote in time, such
convictions are not categorically inadmissible.  See Rule 609(b), SCRE
(stating remote convictions may be admitted if in the interest of justice the
trial court determines the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect).  However, because the trial court focused on the potential
punishment being less than one year, it was never occasioned to determine if
the conviction fell within the exception provided by Rule 609(b). 

Accordingly, the
ruling of the trial court is

REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial. 

FEW, C.J.,
THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.

[1]  Sanders also maintained he was not responsible for
the two-year delay between the alleged assault and his arrest or the three-year
delay between his arrest and trial.

[2]  We note Sanders also lists a second allegation of
error as whether the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury on the issue of consent.  However, because our decision on
the aforementioned issue is dispositive we are not occasioned to address
Sanders' second allegation of error.  See Hughes v. State,
367 S.C. 389, 408-09, 626 S.E.2d 805, 815 (2006) (noting that an appellate
court need not reach remaining issues on appeal when a decision on another
issue is dispositive).