State v. Tanner

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Phillip H.
Tanner, Appellant.

Appeal From Florence County

John M. Milling, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-267

Submitted April 1, 2010 – Filed May 4,
2010   

AFFIRMED

Phillip H. Tanner, of Pennsylvania, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief
Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General Julie M. Thames, all of Columbia;
and Solicitor Edgar Lewis Clements, III, of Florence, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  In
January 2004, Phillip H. Tanner was convicted in absentia of:  (1)
driving under the influence, first offense; (2) driving under suspension; and
(3) open container.  Tanner appeals, arguing:  (1) he did not receive adequate
notice of his trial date; (2) the circuit court erred by considering
information not included in the magistrate's criminal return to determine
Tanner's motion for reconsideration was untimely; and (3) the magistrate court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the driving under the influence
charge after it was remanded from circuit court.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities: 

1. Whether
Tanner received adequate notice of his trial date:  State v. Langston, 275 S.C. 439, 441, 272
S.E.2d 436, 437 (1980) (holding there is a presumption in criminal cases that
"the mailing of a properly stamped and addressed letter which is not
returned by the postal authorities gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that
the letter was received by the addressee in the due course of mail").

2. Whether the
circuit court erred in considering information not included in the magistrate
court's return:  Rule 59(e), SCRCP ("A
motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days
after receipt of written notice of the entry of the order."). 

3. Whether the
magistrate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction: S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-10 (Supp. 2009) (providing in
part "[t]he service of the uniform traffic ticket shall vest all . . .
magistrates' courts with jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the charge for
which the ticket was issued and served."); City of Camden v. Brassell,
326 S.C. 556, 566, 486 S.E.2d 492, 497 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding driving under
the influence, first offense, under section 56-5-2930 is a traffic violation
pursuant to section 20-7-10, and subject matter is vested concurrently in the
municipal courts, magistrate courts, and family courts).

AFFIRMED.

SHORT,
WILLIAMS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.