Murray v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Ricky Lafayette Murray, Appellant,

v.

State of South Carolina a/k/a Department of Corrections, Respondents.

Appeal From Greenville County

 John C. Few, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-229

Submitted March 1, 2010 – Filed April 1,
2010   

AFFIRMED

Ricky L. Murray, pro se, of Greenville, for
Appellant.

Russell  Harter, Jr., of Greenville, for
Respondents.

PER CURIAM: 
Ricky L. Murray filed a complaint with
the circuit court against the State of South Carolina and the South Carolina
Department of Corrections, alleging he was unlawfully arrested by a parole
officer for a parole violation.  The circuit court granted summary judgment on behalf of the State and the Department
of Corrections.  Murray appeals, arguing the circuit court erred in finding: (1)
he pled guilty to possession of crack cocaine in 1994 and the arrest warrant
relied on this alleged offense for probable cause; and (2) his parole arrest
warrant was valid without the signature of an impartial judicial officer.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities. 

1. As to whether the circuit court
erred in finding Murray pled guilty to possession of crack cocaine and such
alleged offense supplied the arrest warrant with probable cause:  Doe
v. Roe, 369 S.C. 351, 376, 631 S.E.2d
317, 330 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An issue is not preserved where the trial court
does not explicitly rule on an argument and the appellant does not make a Rule
59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment."). 

2. As to whether the circuit court erred in finding the
parole arrest warrant valid: 
S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-680 (2007) (providing "the parole agent must issue a warrant or citation charging the
violation of parole");  Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 n.3
(1973) ("Despite the undoubted minor differences between probation and
parole . . . revocation of probation where sentence has been imposed previously
is constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole.");  State
v. Franks, 276 S.C. 636, 639-40, 281 S.E.2d 227, 228 (1981) (holding the
Fourth Amendment's requirement that a neutral, detached magistrate issue an
arrest warrant did not apply to a warrant issued by a probation officer for
violations of probation conditions); State v. Hamilton, 333 S.C. 642,
647, 511 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1999) ("This court's authority to review
such a decision is confined to correcting errors of law unless the lack of a
legal or evidentiary basis indicates the circuit judge's decision was arbitrary
and capricious.").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT,
WILLIAMS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.