State v. Roger Smith

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Roger Dejon
Smith, Appellant.

Appeal From Richland County

Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-078

Submitted February 1, 2010 – Filed
February 2, 2010   

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief
Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Salley W. Elliott, and Solicitor Warren B. Giese, all of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Roger
Dejon Smith appeals his conviction for assault and battery of a high and
aggravated nature (ABHAN).  Smith argues the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over his guilty plea because it did not discuss his waiver of
presentment during the guilty plea and failed to obtain a valid waiver of
presentment on the record.  We
affirm.[1]          

Article V, section 11 of the
South Carolina Constitution grants circuit courts with original jurisdiction
over all criminal cases: 

The
Circuit Court shall be a general trial court with original jurisdiction in
civil and criminal cases, except those cases in which exclusive jurisdiction
shall be given to inferior courts, and shall have such appellate jurisdiction
as provided by law. 

See also State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 101, 610 S.E.2d
494, 499 (2005) ("Circuit courts obviously have subject matter
jurisdiction to try criminal matters."). 

Article I, section 11 of the
South Carolina Constitution recognizes a defendant's right to be notified of
any criminal charges made against him:

No
person may be held to answer for any crime the jurisdiction over which is not
within the magistrate's court, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury of the county where the crime has been committed . . . . The General
Assembly may provide for the waiver of an indictment by the accused.

The South Carolina Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized the presentment of an indictment and the trial
court's subject matter jurisdiction in criminal cases are two distinct issues
that are not dependent on each other.  See Gentry, 363 S.C. at
101-02 n.6, 610 S.E.2d at 499 n.6 ("We note that a presentment of an
indictment or a waiver of presentment is not needed to confer subject matter
jurisdiction on the circuit court. However, an indictment is needed to give
notice to the defendant of the charge(s) against him."); Evans v. State,
363 S.C. 495, 509, 611 S.E.2d 510, 518 (2005) (citations omitted) ("A
defendant has a constitutional right to demand that a grand jury which is
properly established and constituted under the law consider the criminal
allegations against him . . . . [However,] such a challenge does not implicate
the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court."); State v.
Smalls, 364 S.C. 343, 346, 613 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2005) ("Although an
indictment does not confer subject matter jurisdiction, due process requires
that a criminal defendant be properly served with a valid indictment.").   

Based on the case law cited
above, we find that the trial court's failure to discuss Smith's waiver of
presentment during his guilty plea did not invalidate the trial court's subject
matter jurisdiction over his guilty plea.  Because circuit courts have original
jurisdiction over all criminal matters, and Smith was charged with ABHAN by the
State, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Smith's guilty
plea. 

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, A.C.J.,
THOMAS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1]  We decide this case without oral argument
pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.