Norma A. Estrada Baez v. Oscar S. Solano

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Norma A. Estrada Baez, Appellant,

v.

Oscar Serralde Solano, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001975

Appeal From Aiken County
Angela W. Abstance, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-283
Submitted July 24, 2024 – Filed July 26, 2024

AFFIRMED

Jessie J. Glenn, of Glenn Law Firm, LLC, of Aiken, for
Appellant.

Oscar Serralde Solano, of Tlalnepantla de Baz, Mexico,
pro se.

PER CURIAM: Norma A. Estrada Baez (Mother) appeals an order of the family
court finding it did not have jurisdiction to grant her custody of her minor child
(Child) because Mexico had already done so, and therefore, it did not have
jurisdiction to make Mother's requested findings pertaining to Special Immigrant
Juvenile (SIJ) status for Child. On appeal, Mother argues the family court erred by
(1) dismissing the matter for lack of jurisdiction because Child had been abused or
neglected pursuant to South Carolina law and the parties agreed Mother should
have custody, (2) finding there was no case or controversy to be adjudicated, and
(3) finding it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because the complaint failed to
allege a substantial change of circumstances and the possible out-of-country
custody order was not filed with the family court. We affirm.

Mother commenced this action by filing a complaint in the family court seeking "a
decree stating that she is to have custody of [Child]" and requesting the family
court make the additional findings necessary for Child to pursue SIJ status. 1
Mother's complaint further asserted that when she and Father were divorced in
Mexico in 2015, the Mexican court adjudicated the issue of custody and visitation;
she later testified she and Father were awarded joint custody, although she stated
she had never received a written custody order. Father, who was still living in
Mexico, answered the complaint and agreed with Mother's statement of the facts
and her request for custody.

The family court initially found there was "no justiciable case and controversy"
because Mexico had already granted custody of Child to Mother and stated it was
"unable to determine that jurisdiction [wa]s even proper in this case." At the
hearing on Mother's motion to alter or amend the judgment, the family court
allowed Mother to reopen the record to present additional evidence and testimony;
however, Mother did not amend her complaint to request additional relief or move
to conform her pleadings to the evidence in order to seek a finding against Father
for purposes of changing custody or visitation, re-establishing child support, or
terminating Father's rights. The family court denied the motion to alter or amend,
noting Mother presented only one cause of action in her complaint—her request
for custody— and did not ask to register the Mexican order in South Carolina for
enforcement. The family court again stated it could not "issue an order placing
[Child] in the custody of Mother because Mexico ha[d] already issued an order of
custody and one parent remain[ed] a resident of Mexico." It further declined to
make the additional requested SIJ findings, stating it did not have jurisdiction to
make such findings "in a vacuum when there [wa]s no issue of custody, visitation,
child support, enforcement, or divorce to decide."

1
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)-(ii) (setting forth the qualifications for SIJ
status); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a), (c), (d) (detailing the steps required to apply for SIJ
status and the findings required to be made in the state juvenile court order).
We hold the family court correctly determined it did not have jurisdiction over this
action because, pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act2 (UCCJEA), Mexico had exclusive jurisdiction over child
custody determinations involving Child. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-510(A)(1)(e)
(Supp. 2023) (explaining South Carolina has "exclusive original jurisdiction" over
children living in the state "whose custody is the subject of controversy, except in
those cases where the law now gives other courts concurrent jurisdiction");
§ 63-15-308(A) (stating that under the UCCJEA, our courts "treat a foreign country
as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of" determining
jurisdiction); Russell v. Cox, 383 S.C. 215, 217-18, 678 S.E.2d 460, 462 (Ct. App.
2009) ("[A] South Carolina family court . . . may not modify a custody order
issued by a court of another state unless a court of this [s]tate has jurisdiction to
make an initial custody determination under the [UCCJEA] and (1) the court of the
issuing state determines either that it no longer has continuing jurisdiction or that a
court of this [s]tate would be a more convenient forum; or (2) either a South
Carolina court or a court of the issuing state determines that the child [and] the
child's parents . . . do not presently reside in the issuing state.").3 Accordingly, the
family court properly dismissed the action. Because our holding regarding
jurisdiction is dispositive, we decline to address Mother's remaining issues. See
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d
591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not address remaining issues when
its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

2
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 63-15-300 to 63-15-394 (2010).
3
Mother also argues section 63-3-510 of the South Carolina Code gave the family
court concurrent jurisdiction over Child. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-510(A)(1)(a)
(Supp. 2023) (stating the family court has "exclusive original jurisdiction" for
actions "concerning any child living or found within the geographical limits of its
jurisdiction . . . who is neglected as to proper or necessary support" or "who is
abandoned by his parent or other custodian"). First, we note Mother did not make
this argument to the family court. See Herron v. Century BMW, 395 S.C. 461, 465,
719 S.E.2d 640, 642 (2011) ("It is 'axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.'" (quoting Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d
731, 733 (1998))). Additionally, we do not find section 63-3-510(A)(1)(a) gives
the family court the ability to ignore the Mexican court's custody determination,
particularly when the UCCJEA provides for temporary emergency jurisdiction
when necessary to protect a child that has been abandoned or is otherwise in need
of protection. See § 63-15-336(A). Mother did not allege any emergency, nor did
she ever request the family court exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction over
Child.
AFFIRMED. 4

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and TURNER, JJ., concur.

4
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.