Christopher Shimeld v. Richland County Sheriff's Office

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Christopher Shimeld, Appellant,

v.

Richland County Sheriff's Office, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000447

Appeal From Richland County
Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-207
Submitted May 1, 2024 – Filed June 5, 2024

AFFIRMED

Joshua Snow Kendrick, of Kendrick & Leonard, P.C., of
Greenville; and Christopher Shannon Leonard, of
Kendrick & Leonard, P.C., of Columbia, both for
Appellant.

Andrew F. Lindemann, of Lindemann Law Firm, P.A.,
and Robert David Garfield, of Crowe LaFave Garfield &
Bagley, LLC, both of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Christopher Shimeld appeals the circuit court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of the Richland County Sheriff's Office (RCSD) 1 as to
his claims of malicious prosecution, negligent supervision, and false imprisonment.
Shimeld argues the circuit court erred because (1) RCSD was not entitled to
absolute immunity under section 15-78-60(23) of the South Carolina Code (2005),
a subsection of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act 2 (the Act); (2) a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether RCSD had probable cause to support the
issuance of a warrant for Shimeld's arrest; and (3) a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether RCSD negligently supervised its investigator. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the circuit court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of
RCSD as to Shimeld's malicious prosecution claim because Shimeld failed to show
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether probable cause
supported the arrest warrant. See Singleton v. Sherer, 377 S.C. 185, 197, 659
S.E.2d 196, 202 (Ct. App. 2008) ("On appeal from an order granting summary
judgment, the appellate court will review all ambiguities, conclusions, and
inferences arising in and from the evidence in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party."); Kitchen Planners, LLC v. Friedman, 440 S.C. 456, 463, 892
S.E.2d 297, 301 (2023) (affirming summary judgment because the appellant
presented only a "scintilla" of evidence, which "does not provide a meaningful
factual basis on which a factfinder could determine if" it had perfected its lien
timely). We find probable cause existed because the investigator testified (1) she
had evidence of Shimeld's fingerprint on the store's alarm system box with no
plausible reason for it being there; (2) the store's alarm company confirmed they
never employed Shimeld; and (3) the store manager identified Shimeld—from a
photo lineup—as an acquaintance of the person who installed the store's alarm
system. See Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 435, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648
(2006) ("An action for malicious prosecution fails if the plaintiff cannot prove each
of the required elements by a preponderance of the evidence, including malice and
lack of probable cause."); id. at 436, 629 S.E.2d at 649 ("Probable cause means 'the
extent of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable

1
The circuit court noted the parties referred to Respondent as "Richland County
Sheriff's Office" and "Richland County Sheriff's Department," which are not the
proper legal entity. The circuit court determined the proper party name for
Respondent is the "Sheriff of Richland County in his official capacity" and noted
that Appellant consented to a substitution to reflect the appropriate party name.
We will consistently refer to Respondent as "RCSD" like the circuit court.
2
S.C. Code Ann. § § 15-78-10 to -220 (2005 & Supp. 2023).
mind acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor that the person
charged was guilty of a crime for which he has been charged . . . .'" (quoting
Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 322, 143 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1965));
Parrott, 246 S.C. at 323, 143 S.E.2d at 609 (finding probable cause existed for a
warrant based on facts limited to what the officers learned from the victim after
they attempted to reach the plaintiff multiple times but were unable to interview
him prior to arrest). Therefore, we hold the circuit court did not err in finding the
investigator had probable cause to support the warrant and granting summary
judgment on this issue. See Jackson v. City of Abbeville, 366 S.C. 662, 623 S.E.2d
656, 660 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Although the question of whether probable cause exists
is ordinarily a jury question, it may be decided as a matter of law when the
evidence yields but one conclusion."). 3

2. We hold the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment as to the
claim of negligent supervision because Shimeld failed to show a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether RCSD was negligent. See Kitchen Planners,
440 S.C. at 461, 892 S.E.2d at 300 ("[T]he party opposing the motion [must] show
a 'reasonable inference' to be drawn from the evidence."). Shimeld did not produce
any evidence of past misconduct by the investigator such that RCSD knew or
should have known of a need to exercise control over its employee. See Doe v.
Bishop of Charleston, 407 S.C. 128, 139, 754 S.E.2d 494, 500 (2014) ("An
employer may be liable for negligent supervision when (1) his employee
intentionally harms another when he is on the employer's premises, is on premises
he is privileged to enter only as employee, or is using the employer's chattel; (2)
the employer knows or has reason to know he has the ability to control the
employee; and (3) the employer knows or has reason to know of the necessity and
opportunity to exercise such control."); id. at 140, 754 S.E.2d at 501 ("The
employer's knowledge of an employee's dangerousness is an element of the tort of
negligent supervision.").

AFFIRMED. 4

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and TURNER, JJ., concur.

3
Because we affirm the circuit court on the question of probable cause, we decline
to address Shimeld's remaining argument regarding immunity. See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598
(1999) (stating appellate courts need not address remaining issues when the
disposition of prior issues is dispositive).
4
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.