State v. Aaron M. Capers (2)

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Aaron Mckenzie Capers, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-000511

Appeal From Berkeley County
R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-176
Submitted May 8, 2024 – Filed May 22, 2024

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Jessica M. Saxon, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing,
both of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of
Charleston, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Aaron Mckenzie Capers appeals his convictions for first-degree
burglary, first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), kidnapping, armed robbery,
and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent offense and
aggregate sentence of eighty years' imprisonment. On appeal, Capers argues the
trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for reconsideration of his
sentence on three grounds. First, he argues the sentence imposed was not
consistent with the articulated intent of the trial court to provide him a chance to
serve his sentence and be released from prison. Second, he contends the sentence
imposed was not consistent with the articulated intent of the trial court especially
in light of his statistical life expectancy. Finally, he argues the trial court, when
sentencing, improperly considered unconvicted conduct. We affirm pursuant to
Rule 220(b), SCACR.

As to Capers's first issue, that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a
sentence that was not consistent with its articulated intent to provide Capers a
chance to serve his sentence and be released from prison, we hold the trial court
did not abuse its discretion. The trial court was not inconsistent with its stated
intent. The trial court stated it was not going to impose a sentence of life
imprisonment, and it did not. Notwithstanding the trial court's decision not to
impose life imprisonment, the record reflects the trial court intended to sentence
Capers to a lengthy sentence—fifty years' imprisonment for first-degree burglary;
thirty years' imprisonment for first-degree CSC, to run consecutive to the burglary
sentence; and concurrent sentences of thirty years' imprisonment for both
kidnapping and armed robbery and five years' imprisonment on the weapons
charge. The sentences are supported by the evidence and within the statutory
limits. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See In re
M.B.H., 387 S.C. 323, 326, 692 S.E.2d 541, 542 (2010) ("A [sentencing court] has
broad discretion in sentencing within statutory limits."); id. ("A sentence will not
be overturned absent an abuse of discretion when the ruling is based on an error of
law or a factual conclusion without evidentiary support."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-11-311(B) (2015) ("Burglary in the first degree is a felony punishable by life
imprisonment. For purposes of this section, 'life' means until death. The court, in
its discretion, may sentence the defendant to a term of not less than fifteen years.");
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-652(2) (2015) ("Criminal sexual conduct in the first degree
is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than thirty years, according to
the discretion of the court."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-330(A) (2015) (providing a
person found guilty of armed robbery "must be imprisoned for a mandatory
minimum term of not less than ten years or more than thirty years"); S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-3-910 (2015) (providing a person found guilty of kidnapping "must be
imprisoned for a period not to exceed thirty years unless sentenced for murder");
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-490(A) (2015) (providing a defendant who is convicted of
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime faces a
mandatory five-year sentence "in addition to the punishment provided for the
principal crime").

As to Capers's remaining two issues, we hold they are not preserved for appellate
review because they were not raised to nor ruled upon by the trial court. See State
v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003) ("In order for an issue
to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by
the trial [court].").

AFFIRMED. 1

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.