Ronald Ceo, 258464 v. SCDOC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Ronald Ceo, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000180

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Robert Lawrence Reibold, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-328
Submitted September 1, 2023 – Filed October 11, 2023

AFFIRMED

Ronald Ceo, pro se.

Kensey Evans, of the South Carolina Department of
Corrections, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Inmate Ronald Ceo, pro se, appeals an order issued by the
Administrative Law Court (ALC) affirming the disposition by the South Carolina
Department of Corrections (SCDC) of his grievances concerning the application of
good time credits and earned work credits toward the reduction of his sentence of
thirty-five years for a "no parole offense." Ceo argues (1) the ALC erred in finding
he was not entitled to a reduction in his sentence as a result of good time and
earned work credits that he accrued during his incarceration and (2) this finding
amounted to a violation of a state-created liberty interest under the due process
clause of the United States Constitution. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

We hold the ALC correctly upheld SCDC's disposition of Ceo's grievance. See
S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-150(A) (Supp. 2022) (stating an inmate convicted of a no
parole offense and sentenced to the custody of SCDC is not eligible for early
release, discharge, or community supervision until the inmate has served at least
eighty-five percent of the actual term of imprisonment imposed); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 24-13-210(B) (Supp. 2022) (permitting an inmate to earn three days of good time
credit per month but not allowing an inmate's sentence to be reduced below the
minimum term of incarceration); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-230(B) (2007) (allowing
an inmate to earn six days of work credits per month but not allowing an inmate's
sentence to be reduced to below the minimum term of incarceration). We also hold
SCDC's findings were adequately specific to explain its "rationale in sufficient
detail to afford judicial review" because SCDC explained to Ceo that the
information he received regarding his good time credits was incorrect and he was
earning good time credits at the proper rate for an inmate convicted of a no parole
offense. See Porter v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 333 S.C. 12, 22 n.3, 507 S.E.2d
328, 333 n.3 (1998) (stating an administrative agency is required "to make specific
findings of fact and explain its rationale in sufficient detail to afford judicial
review"); id. at 20, 507 S.E.2d at 332 (stating the findings of an administrative
agency are presumptively correct, and the party challenging such a finding "bears
the burden of convincingly proving that the decision is clearly erroneous, or
arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion, in view of the substantial
evidence on the whole record"); see also Lee Cnty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trustees v.
MLD Charter Sch. Acad. Planning Comm., 371 S.C. 561, 567 n.1, 641 S.E.2d 24,
28 n.1 (2007) (stating the rule regarding the burden of a party challenging an
administrative finding is "applicable to all administrative agencies"). Therefore,
we hold the ALC properly upheld SCDC's final agency decision because Ceo
failed to show SCDC's disposition of his grievance was "clearly erroneous, or
arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion, in view of the substantial
evidence on the whole record." Porter, 333 S.C. at 20, 507 S.E.2d at 332.

AFFIRMED. 1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and HEWITT and VERDIN, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.