R-Anell Housing Group, LLC v. Homemax, LLC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

R-Anell Housing Group, LLC, Respondent,

v.

Homemax, LLC, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000658

Appeal From Lexington County
Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-289
Submitted June 1, 2023 – Filed August 9, 2023

AFFIRMED

D. Michael Kelly and Bradley Davis Hewett, both of
Mike Kelly Law Group, LLC, of Columbia; and Thomas
J. Rode, of Thurmond Kirchner & Timbes, P.A., of
Charleston, all for Appellant.

James Samuel Murray and Robert Perry Mangum, both
of Turner Padget Graham & Laney, PA, of Augusta,
Georgia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Homemax, LLC (Homemax) appeals the trial court's decision to
grant R-Anell Housing Group, LLC's (R-Anell's) a directed verdict on Homemax's
negligence claim and to award prejudgment interest. On appeal, Homemax argues
the trial court erred in (1) awarding statutory prejudgment interest to Homemax;
(2) finding the economic loss rule barred Homemax's negligence claims; and (3)
finding email evidence regarding issues with the plastic wrapping on one of
R-Anell's houses was irrelevant. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. Initially, we hold Homemax's argument that the trial court abused its discretion
in awarding prejudgment interest because R-Anell failed to plead prejudgment
interest in its complaint is not preserved for appellate review because Homemax
did not raise this argument to the trial court. See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138,
142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for
appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court].").
Moreover, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding statutory
prejudgment interest to R-Anell, because the amount sought was for a sum certain
and the amount claimed was demandable on March 24, 2018. See Historic
Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 381 S.C. 417, 435, 673 S.E.2d 448, 457-58
(2009) ("The award of prejudgment interest will not be disturbed on appeal unless
the trial court committed an abuse of discretion."); id.at 434, 673 S.E.2d at 457
("An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is based on an error of law or a
factual conclusion without evidentiary support."); S.C. Code Ann. § 34-31-20(A)
(2020) ("In all cases of accounts stated and in all cases wherein any sum or sums of
money shall be ascertained and, being due, shall draw interest according to law, the
legal interest shall be at the rate of eight and three-fourths percent per annum.");
Butler Contracting, Inc. v. Ct. St., LLC, 369 S.C. 121, 133, 631 S.E.2d 252, 258-59
(2006) ("[P]rejudgment interest is allowed on a claim of liquidated damages; i.e.,
the sum is certain or capable of being reduced to certainty based on a mathematical
calculation previously agreed to by the parties."); id. at 133, 631 S.E.2d at 259
("The proper test for determining whether prejudgment interest may be awarded is
whether the measure of recovery, not necessarily the amount of damages, is fixed
by conditions existing at the time the claim arose."); Smith-Hunter Const. Co. v.
Hopson, 365 S.C. 125, 128, 616 S.E.2d 419, 421 (2005) (holding the trial court
properly awarded prejudgment interest when the sum certain was ascertainable and
established by invoices); T.W. Morton Builders, Inc. v. von Buedingen, 316 S.C.
388, 399, 450 S.E.2d 87, 93 (Ct. App. 1994) ("On an obligation to pay money, if
the sum is certain or capable of being reduced to certainty, prejudgment interest is
allowed from a point when the parties agreed, or the law provides, payment was
demandable."); Dixie Bell, Inc. v. Redd, 376 S.C. 361, 371, 656 S.E.2d 765, 770
(Ct. App. 2007) (holding that in order to recover prejudgment interest when there
is no operation of law to make the sum demandable, the plaintiff must prove an
agreement existed between the parties that the sum was actually due or
demandable).

2. We hold the trial court did not err in granting R-Anell's motion for directed
verdict because the economic loss rule barred Homemax's negligence claim. See
Burnett v. Family Kingdom, Inc., 387 S.C. 183, 188, 691 S.E.2d 170, 173 (Ct. App.
2010) ("When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a directed verdict motion, this
court will reverse if no evidence supports the trial court's decision or the ruling is
controlled by an error of law."); id. ("When reviewing the trial court's decision on a
motion for directed verdict, this court must employ the same standard as the trial
court by viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party."); Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 386 S.C. 143, 147,
687 S.E.2d 47, 49 (2009) ("The purpose of the economic loss rule is to define the
line between recovery in tort and recovery in contract."); Tommy L. Griffin
Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 320 S.C. 49, 54-55,
463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1995) ("A breach of a duty which arises under the provisions of
a contract between the parties must be redressed under contract, and a tort action
will not lie."). The residential home exception to the economic loss rule does not
apply here because the expectations of the parties for the delivery of the Christofoli
House were set entirely by contract. See Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg.
Co., 299 S.C. 335, 347, 384 S.E.2d 730, 738 (1989) (holding "[a] builder may be
liable to a home buyer in tort despite the fact that the buyer suffered only
'economic losses' where: (1) the builder has violated an applicable building code;
(2) the builder has deviated from industry standards; or (3) the builder has
constructed housing that he knows or should know will pose serious risks of
physical harm"); id. at 347, 384 S.E.2d at 737 ("The 'economic loss' rule will still
apply where duties are created solely by contract."). Additionally, Homemax's
claim does not fall within the residential home exception because it is a
commercial entity, not an individual homebuyer, which is who the exception was
created to protect. See Sapp, 386 S.C. at 148, 687 S.E.2d at 49 (explaining the
residential home exception was created because a "home is typically an
individual's single largest investment and is a completely different type of
manufactured good than any other type of product that a consumer will buy" and
"the transaction between a builder and a buyer for the sale of a home largely
involves inherently unequal bargaining power").

3. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the emails
between R-Anell and its delivery company regarding issues with the plastic
wrapping on another R-Anell house because the emails did not pertain to the
houses or the plastic wrapping issues involved in this case. 1 See McCall v. IKON,
380 S.C. 649, 660, 670 S.E.2d 695, 701 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The admission or
exclusion of evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose
decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion."); Historic
Charleston Holdings, LLC, 381 S.C. at 434, 673 S.E.2d at 457 ("An abuse of
discretion occurs when the ruling is based on an error of law or a factual
conclusion without evidentiary support."); Way v. State, 410 S.C. 377, 382, 764
S.E.2d 701, 704 (2014) (stating the appealing party must show error as well as
resulting prejudice in order to warrant reversal). The emails did not address issues
with the Christofoli House or Brown House, and the unspecified problems the
delivery company's drivers had with the plastic wrapping, which do not appear to
have resulted in damage to the house delivered, are not relevant to the issues with
the plastic wrapping on the Christofoli House. See Rule 401, SCRE (defining
relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence"); Rule 402, SCRE (stating "[a]ll
relevant evidence is admissible" while "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not
admissible").

AFFIRMED. 2

KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

1
We hold Homemax's argument as to the relevance of the email referencing the
weight of the Christofoli House is not preserved for appellate review because it did
not raise this argument to the trial court. See Dunbar, 356 S.C. at 142, 587 S.E.2d
at 693 ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have
been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court].").
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.