State v. Grayer

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Brandon Christopher Grayer, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000556

Appeal From Charleston County
Kristi F. Curtis, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-133
Submitted March 1, 2023 – Filed April 5, 2023

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and
Assistant Attorney General Julianna E. Battenfield, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of
Charleston, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Brandon C. Grayer appeals his convictions for murder,
attempted murder, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent
crime, and his aggregate sentence of thirty-five years' imprisonment. On appeal,
Grayer argues the trial court erred in limiting the scope of the cross-examination of
two co-conspirators regarding the potential sentences they faced for their murder
charges. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We find the trial court erred in preventing Grayer from cross-examining the
co-conspirators regarding the possible penalties they faced, but the error was
harmless, in light of the other evidence presented and the other opportunities given
to Grayer to demonstrate the co-conspirators' bias. See State v. Gracely, 399 S.C.
363, 371, 731 S.E.2d 880, 884 (2012) ("This Court will not disturb a trial court's
ruling concerning the scope of cross-examination of a witness to test his or her
credibility, or to show possible bias or self-interest in testifying, absent a manifest
abuse of discretion."); State v. Douglas, 369 S.C. 424, 429-30, 632 S.E.2d 845, 848
(2006) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court
either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."); Gracely, 399
S.C. at 372, 731 S.E.2d at 885 ("The Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant
the opportunity to cross-examine a witness concerning bias."); id. at 372, 731
S.E.2d at 885 ("A defendant demonstrates a Confrontation Clause violation when
he is prohibited from 'engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination
designed to show a prototypical form of bias . . . from which jurors . . . could draw
inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'" (quoting State v. Stokes, 381
S.C. 390, 401-02, 673 S.E.2d 434, 439 (2009))); id. at 374-75, 731 S.E.2d at 886
(concluding that "[t]he fact that a cooperating witness avoided a mandatory
minimum sentence is critical information that a defendant must be allowed to
present to the jury"); id. at 375, 731 S.E.2d at 886 ("A violation of the
Confrontation Clause is not per se reversible but is subject to a harmless error
analysis."); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (explaining that
whether Confrontation Clause error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a
host of factors "including the importance of the witness' testimony, whether the
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting testimony on material points, the extent of cross-examination
otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case"); State v.
Whatley, 407 S.C. 460, 469-71, 756 S.E.2d 393, 397-98 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding
the trial court's error in preventing cross-examination of a witness as to their
mandatory minimum sentence for charges pending at the time of trial was harmless
where the defendant had ample opportunity to otherwise demonstrate the witness's
bias, testimony of another witness established the same material facts, and the
witness's testimony did not contradict that of another witness on any essential
point).

AFFIRMED. 1

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.