Jessica Means v. Donald McCutcheon

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Jessica Means and Hall & Means, LLC, Appellants,

v.

Donald B. McCutcheon, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000426

Appeal From Charleston County
Mikell R. Scarborough, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-035
Submitted January 1, 2023 – Filed February 1, 2023

REVERSED AND REMANDED

C. Steven Moskos, of C. Steven Moskos, PA, of North
Charleston, for Appellants.

Donald B. McCutcheon, of Charleston, pro se.

PER CURIAM: Jessica Means and Hall & Means, LLC (collectively, the Law
Firm) appeal the Master-in-Equity's award of attorney's fees in supplemental
proceedings. On appeal, the Law Firm argues (1) the master committed an error of
law by awarding fees in proportion to the underlying debt Donald McCutcheon
owed to the Law Firm and (2) the award was without evidentiary support because
there was no evidence in the record that warranted a reduction in the fees
requested. We reverse and remand.

We hold the master abused his discretion in limiting his award of attorney's fees to
the Law Firm based on the amount of the underlying debt. See Baron Data Sys.,
Inc. v. Loter, 297 S.C. 382, 383, 377 S.E.2d 296, 297 (1989) ("The general rule is
that attorney's fees are not recoverable unless authorized by contract or statute.");
id. at 384, 377 S.E.2d at 297 ("Where there is a contract, the award of attorney's
fees is left to the discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed unless an
abuse of discretion is shown."); Laser Supply & Servs., Inc. v. Orchard Park
Assocs., 382 S.C. 326, 340, 676 S.E.2d 139, 147 (Ct. App. 2009) ("An appellate
court will not reverse an [attorney's fees] award unless it is based on an error of
law or is without any evidentiary support."); Blumberg v. Nealco, Inc., 310 S.C.
492, 494, 427 S.E.2d 659, 660 (1993) ("There are six factors to consider in
determining an award of attorney's fees: 1) nature, extent, and difficulty of the
legal services rendered; 2) time and labor devoted to the case; 3) professional
standing of counsel; 4) contingency of compensation; 5) fee customarily charged in
the locality for similar services; and 6) beneficial results obtained."); Baron Data
Sys., 297 S.C. at 384, 377 S.E.2d at 297 ("Consideration should be given to all six
criteria in establishing reasonable attorney's fees; none of these six factors is
controlling."). In considering the factors for determining a reasonable attorney's
fee award, the master found the Law Firm's time expended was reasonable based
on McCutcheon's actions; the Law Firm achieved an excellent result; the Law Firm
would be responsible for the attorney's fees if McCutcheon did not pay them; the
Law Firm's counsel was a long standing, respected member of the Bar; and
counsel's rate of $390 to $450 an hour was a reasonable fee in the area for civil
litigation. Despite deciding these factors favorably to the Law Firm, the master
limited his award of fees to less than a third of the requested amount because the
size of the underlying debt was relatively small. We hold this limitation was an
error of law. See Taylor v. Medenica, 331 S.C. 575, 582, 503 S.E.2d 458, 462
(1998) ("[T]here is no requirement that an attorney's fee be less than or comparable
to a party's monetary judgment."); id. (explaining an award of attorney's fees may
substantially exceed the actual recovery). As the master noted, McCutcheon made
collecting the outstanding judgment difficult by hiding himself and his assets from
the Law Firm and the court and had needlessly wasted the Law Firm's and the
court's resources. These actions resulted in the Law Firm amassing substantial
attorney's fees and McCutcheon made no argument that the fees were
unreasonable. See Rish v. Rish By & Through Barry, 296 S.C. 14, 16, 370 S.E.2d
102, 104 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the family court abused its discretion in
failing to award a more adequate fee to counsel for the wife); id. at 17, 370 S.E.2d
at 104 (Bell, J., concurring) (rejecting the husband's contention that he could not
afford to pay the wife's attorney's fees for the frivolous action he brought and
explaining that "[t]his court does not sit to relieve self-inflicted wounds"); Rule
208(a)(4), SCACR ("Upon the failure of respondent to timely file a brief, the
appellate court may take such action as it deems proper."); Robinson v. Hassiotis,
364 S.C. 92, 93 n.2, 610 S.E.2d 858, 859 n.2 (Ct. App. 2005) (noting that because
the respondent had not filed a brief, this court may take such action as it deems
proper, including reversal). Accordingly, we reverse the master's order and
remand for an award of reasonable attorney's fees consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1

GEATHERS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.