State v. Jason J. Owen

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jason J. Owen, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000175

Appeal From Beaufort County
Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-019
Submitted November 1, 2022 – Filed January 18, 2023

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Sarah Elizabeth Shipe, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Ambree Michele Muller, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Duffie McDuffie Stone, III, of
Bluffton, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jason J. Owen appeals his conviction for first-degree harassment
and his sentence of five years' imprisonment. On appeal, Owen argues the trial
court erred in admitting multiple instances of character evidence. We affirm.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the following evidence:
flowers left at the victim's house from December 2013 to January 2014 and in
April 2016; cards sent to the victim outside the time period in the indictment; a
prior protective order from Mississippi and the victim's testimony regarding the
order; Owen's interrogation video referencing other prior convictions; and
testimony of alleged property damage to the victim's home. See State v. Pagan,
369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is
within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial
court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."); State v.
Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) ("If there is any evidence to
support the admission of the bad act evidence, the trial judge's ruling will not be
disturbed on appeal.").

Initially, we find the flowers and cards left for the victim tended to make Owen's
guilt more or less probable. See Rule 401, SCRE (stating evidence is relevant if it
has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence"); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1700(C) (2015) (defining stalking
as "a pattern of words, whether verbal, written, or electronic, or a pattern of
conduct"); Rule 404(b), SCRE ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . .
may, . . . be admissible to show motive, identity, the existence of a common
scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent."). Owen's prior
history of sending cards and flowers to the victim was relevant to show a pattern of
conduct under the statute, his identity in sending the letters during the indictment
time period, his intent to harass the victim, and his plan for continued unwanted
contact with the victim. See State v. Gillian, 373 S.C. 601, 609, 646 S.E.2d 872,
876 (2007) (holding evidence that the defendant was in possession of property later
used in the commission of crime was admissible to prove identity); State v. Varvil,
338 S.C. 335, 341, 526 S.E.2d 248, 252 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding evidence that a
person who repeatedly telephoned another and went "out of his way to drive by her
home and office" was relevant to show intent); State v. Tutton, 354 S.C. 319, 328,
580 S.E.2d 186, 191 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Where there is a pattern of continuous
misconduct, . . . that pattern supplies the necessary connection to support the
existence of a plan.").

Further, during his opening statement, Owen opened the door for the admission of
the prior protective order. See Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 188, 379 S.E.2d
123, 125 (1989) ("In a criminal case, the State cannot attack the character of the
defendant unless the defendant herself first places her character in issue."); State v.
Beam, 336 S.C. 45, 52, 518 S.E.2d 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1999) ("[W]hen a party
introduces evidence about a particular matter, the other party is entitled to explain
it or rebut it, even if the latter evidence would have been incompetent or irrelevant
had it been offered initially.").

Finally, any error in the admission of the interrogation video regarding Owen's
other prior convictions or testimony of alleged property damage was harmless
because the jury was already aware of Owen's previous convictions prior to the
video and Owen was never connected to the alleged property damage. See Pagan,
369 S.C. at 212, 631 S.E.2d at 267 ("Generally, appellate courts will not set aside
convictions due to insubstantial errors not affecting the result."); id. ("Thus, an
insubstantial error not affecting the result of the trial is harmless where guilt has
been conclusively proven by competent evidence such that no other rational
conclusion can be reached.").

AFFIRMED. 1

GEATHERS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.