Bonita Steed v. Antoine Heyward

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Bonita Steed and Bernard Steed, Respondents,

v.

Antoine Heyward, Ruby Heyward and also all other
persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate, interest
in or lien upon the real estate described in the amended
complaint herein, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2020-001104

Appeal From Charleston County
Bentley Price, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-445
Submitted November 1, 2022 – Filed December 7, 2022

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Karen Marie DeJong, of DeJong Law Firm, LLC, of
Mount Pleasant, for Appellants.

Alice F. Paylor, of Saxton & Stump, LLC, of Charleston,
for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Antoine Heyward and Ruby Heyward appeal the circuit court's
order granting summary judgment to Bonita Steed and Bernard Steed. The circuit
court held the Steeds had established adverse possession of the property (the
Property) and the Heywards' action to quiet title to the Property was barred by the
doctrine of laches. The Heywards also appeal the circuit court's order granting
sanctions. We reverse and remand.

1. We hold the circuit court erred in granting the Steeds summary judgment on
their claim for adverse possession of the Property. See Lanham v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of S.C., Inc., 349 S.C. 356, 361, 563 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2002) ("An
appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment under the same standard
applied by the [circuit] court pursuant to Rule 56, SCRCP."); id. ("Summary
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); id. at 362, 563 S.E.2d at 333
("On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court will
review all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the
evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party below."); McDaniel v.
Kendrick, 386 S.C. 437, 442, 688 S.E.2d 852, 855 (Ct. App. 2009) ("In order to
establish a claim of adverse possession, the claimant must prove by clear and
convincing evidence his possession of the subject property was continuous, hostile,
actual, open, notorious, and exclusive for the statutory period."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 15-67-210 (2005) (stating that the relevant statutory period for adverse
possession is ten years). We hold there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the Steeds' possession of the Property was exclusive because Robert
Heyward, the Heywards' predecessor in title, stayed on the Property during the
time of his ownership. See Butler v. Lindsey, 293 S.C. 466, 472, 361 S.E.2d 621,
624 (Ct. App. 1987) ("The exclusive possession necessary to acquire title by
adverse possession is not satisfied if occupancy is shared with the owner or with
agents of the owner."). In addition, we hold there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the Steeds' possession of the Property was hostile. See Taylor v.
Heirs of William Taylor, 419 S.C. 639, 652, 799 S.E.2d 919, 925 (Ct. App. 2017)
("[F]or the possession to be hostile when an entire tract of land is at issue, the
adverse claimant need not show a conscious intent to dispossess the true owner.");
id. ("The claimant may establish hostile possession by showing he occupied the
property without the title owner's consent even if he occupied the property under
the mistaken belief that it belonged to him."); Davis v. Monteith, 289 S.C. 176,
180, 345 S.E.2d 724, 726 (1986) ("To invoke adverse possession, the possession
must be adverse and not permissive."); Young v. Nix, 286 S.C. 134, 136, 332
S.E.2d 773, 774 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Where one enters land under permission from
the title holder, the possession can never ripen into an adverse title unless a clear
and positive disclaimer of the title under which entry was made is brought home to
the other party."). It is undisputed the Steeds' occupancy of the Property was not
adverse when they began living on the Property in 1966 at the invitation of Louise
Heyward, who owned the Property at that time. Antoine Heyward testified his
family continued to allow the Steeds' permissive use of the Property after she
deeded it to Robert Heyward in 1999. See Davis, 289 S.C. at 180, 345 S.E.2d at
726 (finding plaintiff's possession of property was not hostile when he used the
property with the knowledge and tacit permission of the owner). In contrast, the
Steeds stated they occupied the Property because they believed they owned it
based on a plat their mother gave them showing she was the owner of the Property.
We hold a question of fact exists as to whether the Steeds' possession of the
Property was exclusive and whether their initial permissive occupancy ripened into
adverse title. Therefore, further inquiry into the facts is necessary to determine if
the Steeds have established all of the requirements of adverse possession by clear
and convincing evidence. See Englert, Inc. v. LeafGuard USA, Inc., 377 S.C. 129,
134, 659 S.E.2d 496, 498 (2008) ("[S]ince it is a drastic remedy, summary
judgment should be cautiously invoked so that a litigant will not be improperly
deprived of a trial on disputed factual issues."); id. ("Summary judgment is not
appropriate where further inquiry into the facts of the case is desirable to clarify
the application of the law.").

2. We hold the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to the Steeds on
the Heywards' counterclaim to quiet title. We hold a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether the Heywards were aware of the Steeds' ownership claim to
the Property and further inquiry into the facts is necessary to determine if the
Heywards' claim to quiet title is barred by the doctrine of laches. See Jones v.
Leagan, 384 S.C. 1, 19-20, 681 S.E.2d 6, 16 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The equitable
doctrine of laches is defined as 'neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, under circumstances affording opportunity for diligence, to do what in law
should have been done.'" (quoting Hallums v. Hallums, 296 S.C. 195, 198, 371
S.E.2d 525, 527 (1998))); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Driver, 317 S.C.
471, 479, 451 S.E.2d 924, 929 (Ct. App. 1994) ("[L]aches arises upon the failure to
assert a known right under circumstances indicating that the lached party has
abandoned or surrendered the right."); Jones, 384 S.C. at 20, 681 S.E.2d at 16
("The party seeking to establish laches must show (1) delay, (2) that was
unreasonable under the circumstances, and (3) prejudice."); Englert, 377 S.C. at
134, 659 S.E.2d at 498 ("[S]ince it is a drastic remedy, summary judgment should
be cautiously invoked so that a litigant will not be improperly deprived of a trial on
disputed factual issues."); id. ("Summary judgment is not appropriate where further
inquiry into the facts of the case is desirable to clarify the application of the law.").
3. In light of the Steeds' consent to the Heywards' request to remand the motion
for sanctions to the circuit court, we reverse the order of sanctions and remand.

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1

GEATHERS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.